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PROMOTING BETTER HEALTH
CARE: POLICY ARGUMENTS
FOR CONCURRENT
QUALITY ASSURANCE
AND ATTORNEY-CLIENT
HOSPITAL INCIDENT REPORT
PRIVILEGES
Cynthia J. Dollart
I. INTRODUCTION: THE QUALITY-CONFIDENTIALITY
CONNECTION
HOSPITAL INCIDENT reports are dual purpose documents,
used both by the hospital attorney to prepare for potential litiga-
tion and by hospital quality managers to identify and correct
problems so that the quality of health care is improved.1 To pro-
mote full disclosure of truthful information in medical malpractice
law suits, some courts have begun to compel discovery of hospital
incident reports requested by plaintiffs' attorneys and to admit them
into evidence at trial, declaring that such reports are neither pro-
tected by attorney work product immunity2 nor inadmissible as
hearsay.3 The attorney-client privilege4 does not consistently pro-
tect incident reports because they are prepared for other persons,
such as liability insurers and hospital risk managers and quality
committees, as well as for the attorney.' Because health care prov-
t This paper was written under the supervision of Professor Maxwell J. Mehlman.
1. See infra § II for further discussion of the nature and purposes of hospital incident
reports.
2. See, eg., cases arguing for work product immunity: Sims v. Knollwood, 511 So. 2d
154 (Ala. 1987); State ex rel. Faith Hosp. v. Enright, 706 S.W.2d 852 (Mo. 1986); Kay Labo-
ratories v. Dist. Court of Clo., 653 P.2d 721 (Colo. 1982); Payne v. Howard, 75 F.R.D. 465
(D.D.C. 1977); Hospital Corp. of America v. Dixon, 330 So. 2d 737 (Fla. 1976). See infra
note 48 for a full discussion of work product arguments for hospital incident reports.
3. See infra note 47 for a discussion of the inapplicability of the hearsay exception and
treatment of hospital incident reports as admissions by defendant hospitals.
4. See infra § III for full discussion of the attorney-client privilege.
5. See, e.g., cases holding that attorney-client confidentiality is lost when the informa-
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iders' conduct is influenced by potential legal consequences, this
trend by the courts to compel discovery of hospital incident reports
will discourage health care providers from making immediate, full
disclosure; rather, health care providers will likely report only mini-
mal factual descriptions of accidents already contained in the pa-
tient's chart.6 Incident reports will no longer indicate witnesses'
mental impressions (opinions) regarding causation, potential liabil-
ity, and suggestions for correcting the causes of incidents. They will
simply notify hospital attorneys of the facts of an incident which
might lead to a lawsuit against the hospital. The second useful pur-
pose of incident reports-improving the quality of health care-will
be thwarted because of the health care worker's fear that the infor-
mation contained in the reports will be used to demonstrate his or
her negligence in court.7
This Note addresses the two different, but equally important,
justifications for hospital incident report privilege: to encourage full
disclosure of information to hospital attorneys for liability loss pre-
vention by recognizing the attorney-client privilege, and to promote
full disclosure of the information to hospital personnel who are re-
sponsible for reducing internal risk and improving the quality of
care by adopting a new concurrent privilege, a quality assurance
privilege. The Note examines how courts and state statutes have
previously dealt with the issue of privilege: through the attorney-
client privilege,' through the medical peer review committee privi-
tion has been shared with other parties: State ex rel. Children's Medical Ctr. v. Brown, 59
Ohio St. 3d 194 (1991); Dunkin v. Silver Cross Hosp., 573 N.E. 2d 848 (11. App. 1991);
White v. New York City Health & Hospitals Corp., No. 88 Civ. 7536, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
3008 (S.D. N.Y. 1990); Hospital Corp. of America v. Dixon, 330 So. 2d 737 (Fla. 1976);
Bernardi v. Community Hosp. Ass'n, 443 P.2d 708 (Colo. 1968).
6. See White v. New York City Health & Hosp. Corp., No. 88 Civ. 7536, 1990 U.S.
Dist. Lexis 3008, at 16-22 (quoting Wayne M. Austin, DOH Director of Bureau of Hospital
Services) (although this court denied the incident report privilege, it validated the confidenti-
ality rationales offered by a Department of Health official). The court stated
[u]nless incident reports [are] protected from disclosure hospitals might be re-
luctant to adhere to the reporting requirements or their reports might not be com-
plete or forthright. [citations omitted]. Hospitals could be exposed to liability as a
result of the events required to be reported and therefore a reluctance to file reports
could be anticipated... [P]rompt identification of hospital deficiencies can prevent
the recurrence of problems. The State therefore has a strong governmental interest
in ensuring the confidentiality of hospital incident reports.
Id. (quoting Wayne M. Osten, DOH Director of Bureau of Hospital Services, para. 9).
7. See Id.
8. See, eg., cases arguing for attorney-client privilege: Sierra Vista v. Shaffer, 56 Cal.
Rptr. 387 (1967); Bernardi v. Community Hosp. Ass'n, 443 P.2d 708, 715-16 (Colo. 1968);
St. Louis Little Rock Hosp., Inc. v. Gaertner, 682 S.W.2d 146 (Mo. 1984); Hawkins v. Dist.
Court, 638 P.2d 1372 (Colo. 1982); Clark v. Norris, 734 P.2d. 182 (Mont. 1986); In re Fran-
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lege,9 and by considering the policy underlying the subsequent re-
medial measures rule of evidence.
10
This Note proposes a model rule establishing concurrent hospi-
tal incident report privileges, attorney-client privileges and quality
assurance privileges, and defends the rule11 based on the policy un-
derlying the peer review privilege and the subsequent remedial
measures rule.12 If the plaintiffs' attorneys use hospital incident re-
ports to prove negligence, health care workers will not freely cri-
tique their fellow workers' actions. Quality improvement personnel
will not have the confidential information as needed for taking cor-
rective action unless there are two privileges at work, the same com-
munication must be privileged in the hands of both the attorney and
the quality assurance personnel.
II. BACKGROUND: HOSPITAL DOCUMENTATION:
HOW HOSPITAL INCIDENT REPORTS ARE
DIFFERENT FROM THE MEDICAL
RECORD.
The proliferation of medical malpractice suits, which began in
the 1980s,13 has caused physicians, nurses, and other hospital per-
cis v. St. Thomas Hosp. No. C.A. 8556 (C.A. Ohio Dec. 7, 1977). See infra § III(A) and
accompanying text for the development of the attorney-client privilege.
9. See, eg., cases arguing for analogy to peer review privilege: Gallagher v. Detroit-
Macomb Hosp. Ass'n, 431 N.W.2d (Mich. 1990); Beth Israel Hosp. Ass'n v. Board of Regis-
tration in Medicine, 515 N.E.2d 574 (Mass. 1987); Willing v. St. Joseph Hosp., 531 N.E.2d
824 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988); Bredice v. Doctors Hosp., 51 F.R.D. 187 (D.D.C. 1970); Laws v.
Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 656 F. Supp. 824 (D.D.C. 1987); Santa Rosa Memorial Hosp. v.
Superior Court of Sonoma County, 220 Cal. Rptr. 226 (1985); Marsh v. Lake Forest Hosp.,
519 N.E.2d 504 (ill. App. Ct. 1988); Flannery v. Lin, 531 N.E.2d 403 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988).
See infra § III.B.1, for an explanation of peer review privilege and why its policies are a
powerful defense of hospital incident report privilege.
10. The subsequent remedial measures argument is offered through an analysis of the
role of incident reports in improving the quality of health care. See text infra § III(B)(3) for a
discussion of the subsequent remedial measures rule and policy.
11. See infra § IV(A)(1) and accompanying text. Some of the objections are that inci-
dent reports do not meet the standards for attorney-client privilege, and plaintiffs need for
access to timely information about hospital accidents which would not otherwise be available
to them through the medical record.
12. See, eg., Bredice v. Doctor's Hosp. Inc., 51 F.R.D. 187 (D.D.C. 1970); Shelton v.
Morehead Memorial Hosp., 347 S.E.2d 824, 828 (N.C. 1986) (granting hospital incident re-
port privilege because the societal interest in improving health care will be promoted by open,
confidential communication among health care providers).
13. See generally David J. Nye, et al. The Causes of the Malpractice Crisis An Analysis
of Claims Data and Insurance Company Finances, 76 GEO. L.J. 1495 (1988). Some alarming
statistics evidence the crisis: although the overall frequency of claims (number of claims
filed) has not increased significantly, the severity of claims (amount of damages awarded per
claim) has increased dramatically especially in such areas as pediatrics, from approximately
1993]
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sonnel to practice defensive medicine.14 To ward off potential liabil-
ity, not only are hospital personnel ordering more tests and
procedures, but also a greater percentage of health care workers'
time is consumed with documentation, the preparation of the medi-
cal record, and completion of a variety of other paperwork required
by insurers, attorneys, accreditation agencies, and review boards. 5
The medical record, commonly referred to as the patient's
"chart", is intended to be an objective factual recounting of health
care workers' observations and diagnostic reports of a patient. 16
Several federal and state governmental agencies and the Joint Com-
mission on the Accreditation of Health Care Organizations (herein-
after "JCAHCO") require medical records for licensure,
reimbursement, and accreditation purposes. 7 The chart includes,
but is not limited to, laboratory results, descriptions of procedures
performed upon the patient, medications given and the response to
them, supplies used in the patient's care, dialogue with the patient,
and any consent forms the patient may have signed authorizing
treatment. 18
Most states have statutory penalties for inaccurate, incomplete,
or falsified hospital records,19 which help to insure that the chart is
$56,000 in 1975 to $304,000 in 1986; neurosurgery, from about $34,000 in 1975 to $194,000
in 1986; and obstetrics and gynecology, from $14,000 in 1975 to $161,000 in 1986. Insurance
costs for all physicians and hospitals increased from $2.5 billion in 1983 to $4.7 billion in
1985. Ninety-four percent of Florida obstetricians and gynecologists (a state and specialty
with some of the highest increases in malpractice premiums) increased their fees in response
to the increased premiums, but relative incomes still declined.
14. Defensive medicine may mean ordering more tests and utilizing more conservative
therapies or more drastic measures, such as refusing to treat patients for fear of liability. See
Jon Nordheimer, Doctors Withhold Services in Protest on Insurance, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10,
1986 at A25.
15. See JANINE FIESTA, THE LAW AND LIABILITY: A GUIDE FOR NURSES 173-175
(2nd ed. 1988) (noting the relationship between malpractice litigation and the necessity for
increased documentation because omissions in documentation could be used to establish neg-
ligence - if something is not documented, plaintiff's attorneys allege it was not done for the
patient). Cf., Julie Rovner, Congress Feels the Pressure of Health-Care Squeeze, 49 CONG. Q.,
414, 414 (1991). "[-]ealth care providers... are drowning in... 'paper snow.'" Id.
16. See, eg., GiNNY W. GUIDO, LEGAL ISSUES IN NURSING: A SOURCE BOOK FOR
PRACTICE (1988); WILLIAM H. ROACH, JR. ET AL., MEDICAL RECORDS AND THE LAW 126
(1985) (describing the legal requirements for the contents of the medical record).
17. See CARMELLE P. COURNOYER, THE NURSE MANAGER AND THE LAW 219-220
(1989); FIESTA, supra note 15, at 174-175; GUIDO, supra note 16, at 97-98.
18. See GUIDo, supra note 16, at 98 ("Basic information that should be recorded for any
patient includes (1) personal data as name, date of birth, sex, marital status, occupation, and
person(s) to be contacted for emergencies, (2) financial data as to one's health insurance
carrier with assignment of rights, patient employer, and person responsible for payment of
the final bill, and (3) medical data").
19. See ROACH, supra note 16, at 15 and Appendix B. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT.
[Vol. 3:259
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a thorough factual representation of the patient's hospitalization
both for internal and external use.20 Although health care provid-
ers may complain about the volume of documentation they are re-
quired to complete, most of the documentation serves useful
purposes, benefits the providers themselves, and ultimately benefits
their patients.21
The hospital incident report is one controversial form of docu-
mentation with great potential benefits for both providers and pa-
tients.22 A hospital incident is "any event or circumstance not
consistent with the normal routine operations of the hospital and its
staff or the routine care of a patient. It may be an error, an acci-
dent, or a situation which could have, or has, resulted in injury to a
person or damage to hospital equipment or property. '2 3 Incidents
include events such as losing a patient's belongings,24 a minor medi-
cation error which results in no injury to the patient, a nurse acci-
dentally sticking himself or herself with a dirty needle, a visitor
falling on a freshly mopped floor, or a bathtub drowning of an unat-
tended patient. Incident reports can provide an invaluable addition
to the simple factual description recited in the medical record pro-
vided they detail mental impressions and other subjective informa-
tion.25 Currently, however, health care workers are inhibited about
including this subjective information for fear that it will be disclosed
to persons outside the hospital who could use it to incriminate them
in some way, such as opposing counsel in a lawsuit.26
Prepared subsequent to an accident or otherwise non-routine oc-
ANN. § 36-125.05 (1992); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 24-7-8, 31-8-34 (1991); MISS. CODE ANN.
§ 41-9-63 (1972); NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-2024 (1990).
20. See FIESTA, supra note 15, at 173-193 (internal reports are for use in problem-solv-
ing within the institution; external documentation is mandated by insurers, government agen-
cies and accreditors).
21. For example, careful documentation on insurance forms and quality assurance re-
ports may result in insurance company reimbursement to the hospital and physician for a
patient who would not ordinarily meet the criteria for payment. The patient benefits, from a
purely financial standpoint, by not being personally responsible for the bill. The hospital
benefits by receiving payment expeditiously or receiving payment it might not have received
at all.
22. See Gladys Duran, Positive Use of Incident Reports, 53 Hosps. 60, 60 (1979); JOHN
F. MONAGLE, RISK MANAGEMENT: A GUIDE FOR HEALTH CARE PROFESSIONALS 29
(1985).
23. MONAGLE supra note 22, at 29.
24. See, eag., John C. Lincoln Hosp. & Health Ctr. v. Superior Court of Arizona, 768
P.2d 188, 191 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989).
25. See Appendix A for a sample hospital incident report.
26. See GUIDO, supra note 16, at 108 ("Do not infer assumptions ... [a]bove all, never
imply liability").
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currence in the hospital, incident reports serve two basic purposes.
First, incident reports furnish the hospital's attorney with an ac-
count of the events and circumstances which might lead to a legal
claim against the hospital.27 Second, they pinpoint both procedures
and practices which need to be changed and employees who may
need further education or discipline.28 This improves the quality of
care29 provided to patients and makes a safer environment for em-
ployees and visitors to the hospital.3" Alerting hospital attorneys to
potential litigation is commonly referred to as the risk management
(hereinafter "RM") function of incident reports, and, arguably, the
RM use of incident reports is protected by the attorney-client privi-
lege.31 Identifying problem procedures and employees needing re-
medial attention is known as the quality assurance (hereinafter
"QA") function.32 Although improving the quality of care is prob-
ably a more compelling reason than protecting the hospital from a
lawsuit for granting privilege to hospital incident reports, at present
courts are split on whether reports sent to persons other than the
attorney are entitled to privilege.33
The quality assurance movement in hospital care dates from the
27. See generally Elizabeth L. Allan & Kenneth N. Baker, Fundamentals of Medication
Error Research, 47 AM. J. Hosp. PHARM. 555, 561 (1990); Karen Puetz, QA Communique"
Development of an Incident Reporting System, QRB Aug. 1988, 245; SHIZUKO Y.
FAGERHAUGH, ET AL., HAZARDS IN HosPITAL CARE: ENSURING PATIENT SAFETY (1987).
Each discusses the role of incident reports in alerting the hospital attorneys to potential
claims.
28. See MONAGLE, supra note 22, at 29-30. Some authors suggest positive reinforce-
ment techniques to encourage incident reporting in spite of the potential for discipline, focus-
ing on education rather than punishment. See, eg., Duran, supra note 22, at 60.
29. Although quality is a value judgment, this note adopts Thompson's definition of
quality: "the optimal achievable result for each patient, the avoidance of [health care
worker]-induced (iatrogenic) complications, and the attention to patient and family needs in a
manner that is both cost-effective and reasonably documented." NANcY 0. GRAHAM,
QUALITY ASSURANCE IN HOsPITALS" STRATEGIES FOR ASSESSMENT AND IMPLEMENTA-
TION 9 (2d ed. 1990), quoting Richard Thompson, personal communication, May 1980.
30. See, JEAN G. CARROLL, RESTRUCTURING HOSPITAL QUALITY ASSURANCE 79
(1984).
31. See infra § III for a further discussion of this privilege.
32. PuETz, supra note 27, at 245 ("The incident report serves at least two purposes. As
a basis for QA activities, it can identify deficits in hospital systems or in employees' behavior
or knowledge. For RM, it serves as evidence for defense of an actual or potential lawsuit.").
33. See, eg., cases granting privilege to incident reports: Bredice v. Doctor's Hosp.,
Inc., 51 F.R.D. 187 (D.D.C. 1970); Sierra Vista Hosp. v. Superior Court, 56 Cal. Rptr. 387
(1967); Enke v. Anderson, 733 S.W.2d 462 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987); and cases denying privilege
to incident reports: Clark v. Norris, 734 P.2d 182 (Mont. 1987); State ex rel Children's
Medical Ctr. v. Brown, 571 N.E.2d 724 (Ohio 1991); Bernardi v. Community Hosp. Assn.,
443 P.2d 708 (Colo. 1968).
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efforts of Florence Nightingale in the 1860s.34 The Joint Commis-
sion on the Accreditation of Health Care Organizations
(JCAHCO), established in 1952 as the Joint Commission on the Ac-
creditation of Hospitals, (hereinafter "JCAH"), began to promote
"medical audits" in 1955.31 In 1981 JCAHCO executed its Quality
Assessment Standard which compelled hospitals desirous of accred-
itation to develop a single medical audit system that integrated inci-
dent reports; mortality, tissue, transfusion, and antibiotic
monitoring studies; and medical records and privileging stan-
dards.3 6 In 1986 JCAH changed its name to JCAHCO and imple-
mented it Agenda for Change, a program aimed at improving the
quality of health care by monitoring health care facilities' out-
comes."7 The law which created Health Maintenance Organiza-
tions (hereinafter "HMOs") in 1973 required federally subsidized
HMOs to develop quality assessment programs.38 Since their im-
plementation, both Medicare and Medicaid programs require hospi-
tals to perform "utilization review" to assess the quality of care
provided.39 Professional Standards Review Organizations (herein-
after "PSROs") were created by the 1972 Social Security Act
Amendments to provide external quality review for hospitals receiv-
ing Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement.' Because of the exter-
nal pressures from these various licensure, accreditation, and
reimbursement programs, hospitals have developed internal quality
assurance and risk management programs to ensure that the hospi-
tals are in compliance with the external quality standards, to im-
prove the hospitals' outcomes where possible, and to generate the
reports required by the external agencies.
Although the two uses of hospital incident reports-liability de-
fense and quality improvement-are different, the distinction be-
tween quality assurance and risk management is blurred when the
attorney advises the hospital to implement corrective action (subse-
quent remedial measures) based on information contained in the in-
cident reports. The attorney's area of expertise is the application of
the law to a particular hospital situation. The medical, nursing,
34. See GRAHAM, supra note 29, at 6-7. Nightingale developed a statistical system for
comparing mortality rates among hospitals.
35. Id. at 7-8.
36. Id. at 8.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. See RiCHARD H. EGDAHL & PAUL M. GERTMAN, QUALITY ASSURANCE IN
HEALTH CARE 76-81 (1976).
40. Id. at 80.
19931
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pharmacy, and engineering personnel use their expertise to translate
the lawyer's advice into improving hospital practice. Hospital ac-
tions triggered by incident reports that improve the quality of care
for patients also reduce the hospital's exposure to litigation, which
could lower the cost of health care to consumers.4' If a hospital
were to implement safer procedures based on data gathered from
incident reports, both patients and health care workers would bene-
fit. Positive results would include fewer accidents and shorter stays
in the hospital.42 For these reasons, full and confidential disclosure
of information surrounding the "incident" to both attorneys and
quality assurance advisors is crucial to improving the quality of
health care and to the efficient functioning of hospitals. If the dual
purpose incident report remains confidential by disallowing discov-
ery by a plaintiff, it may contain a useful, evaluative "self-critical
analysis";43 a health care worker, witnesses to the incident, Quality
Assurance (hereinafter "QA") committees, and risk managers will
feel uninhibited to hypothesize about the potential causation for an
accident or injury and to offer potential solutions or remedial meas-
ures which may prevent similar problems from occurring in the
future.
Medical records tend to have less remedial value than incident
reports because they tend to be basic recountings of the facts, with-
out impressions regarding fault or other extenuating circumstances
which may have influenced the situation.' Because risk managers
41. See generally, Eli Ginzberg, A Hard Look At Cost Containment, 316 NEw ENG. J.
MED. 1151 (1987); Malpractice Crisis: How Its Hurting Medical Care, U.S. NEws & WORLD
REP., May 26, 1975, at 26.
42. For example, if it can be shown through incident report data that only the patients
in the intensive care unit who were cared for by Nurse X acquired staphylococcus (a bacteria
commonly carried on the hands) infections in their surgical wounds, the hospital would be
alerted that Nurse X is the infection carrier. Perhaps Nurse X needs more training in aseptic
technique, or Nurse X was assigned too many patients so the hospital supervisor should have
called in more staff members. If remaining infection-free saves the surgical patient five days
in the intensive care unit, the patient and the insurer have been spared the expense. Also the
patient has been spared the discomfort of the infection and the cost of the antibiotics to treat
it. If Nurse X improves handwashing and wound dressing skills, and the hospital lowers the
patient-nurse ratio, fewer patients will die from septic shock or suffer other injuries; therefore,
the hospital will have less potential exposure to liability for negligent practices and may cut
costs via increased efficiency.
43. See generally Note, The Privilege of Self-Critical Analysis, 96 HARv. L. REV. 1083
(1983).
44. See generally, JEAN G. CARROLL, RESTRUCTURING HOSPITAL QUALITY ASSUR-
ANcE 74-79 (1984); and ROBERT D. MILLER, PROBLEMS IN HOSPITAL LAW 287-316 (5th
ed. 1986). These books discuss collection and disclosure of patient information through the
medical record and incident reports including the importance of confidentiality of patient
information from a physician-patient privilege standard.
[Vol. 3:259
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and attorneys do not review every chart, if no incident report is
prepared in addition to the medical record, they may not be made
aware of incidents until much later; when the medical record is
scrutinized after a lawsuit is brought, memories of the event may be
stale and witnesses may no longer be available. This delay and lack
of specificity could impair the preparation of an adequate defense by
the health care provider's attorneys and increase the likelihood that
repeated incidents will occur before the hospital Risk Management
(hereinafter "RM"), QA personnel, and attorney become aware of
the underlying problem, and take corrective action.45 Additionally,
a pattern of incidents might make it more likely that future mishaps
will occur and that the hospital or the physician will be found negli-
gent. The corrective and preventative functions of the incident re-
port would be reduced or eliminated if it is not prepared at all or
becomes merely a formalistic repetition of the facts within the
chart. Nonetheless, these will be the results if discovery and admis-
sibility of incident reports is compelled" as when courts treat the
reports as admissions by defendant hospitals47 or determine that
45. See white v. New York City Health & Hospitals Corp., No. 88 Civ. 7536, 1990 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 3008 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 1990); (hospital not allowed to claim incident report
confidentiality privilege in infant kidnapping case); Rees v. Doctor's Hospital, Case No. CA-
5226, Slip. Op. (C.A. Ohio Feb. 6, 1980) (hospital denied confidentiality privilege for incident
report, court cited need for timely declarations of witnesses). Both cases argue for the need
for the timely statements of witnesses.
46. However, the health care provider's primary motivations for any documentation is
to provide communication to others so that continuity of patient care is maintained, and as
an assessment, planning, research and educational tool, consequently, it is not possible to
accurately gauge just how much of a disincentive to full disclosure compelled discovery and
admissibility would be. See FIEsTA, supra note 15, at 173; COURNOYER, supra note 17, at
219.
47. Admissions are admissible into evidence because of a belief that the party making
the statement would not purposely say anything self-incriminating unless it were true.
(d) Statements which are not hearsay
A Statement is not hearsay if-
(2) Admission by party-opponent. The statement is offered against a party
and is (A) the party's own statement, in either an individual or a representa-
tive capacity or (B) a statement of which the party has manifested an adop-
tion or belief in its truth, or (C) a statement by a person authorized by the
party to make a statement concerning the subject, or (D) a statement by the
party's agent or servant concerning a matter within the scope of the agency
or employment, made during the existence of the relationship, or (E) a state-
ment by a coconspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of
the conspiracy.
FED. R. EViD. 801(d)(2).
Prior to the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975, defendant hospitals'
attorneys argued that incident reports were inadmissible hearsay because historically medical
records were treated as such. See, ag., Sligar v. Tucker, 267 So. 2d 54, 55 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1972) (holding that incident reports were routinely prepared and examined by the hos-
268 HEALTH MATRIX [Vol. 3:259
pital staff, but declaring that because they were submitted to the liability insurer, they were
not a part of the admissible business records; "but even if they were, they would nonetheless
retain their privileged status"), cert denied, 271 So. 2d 146 (Fla. 1972). Cf Picker X-ray
Corp. v. Frerker, 405 F.2d 916, 922-23 (8th Cir. 1969) (discussing incident reports prepared
by hospital staff after a catheter broke off in a patient's artery during a radiologic procedure,
the court acknowledged that the incident reports were ordinary business records, but denied
admissibility. See Roach, Cheroff& Esley, supra note 16, at 118 n.4. The Federal Rules of
Evidence defined as "a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the
trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted." FED R. EViD.
801(c). Hearsay statements are not admissible into evidence unless the rules provide a spe-
cific exception for the statement. FED. R. EVID. 802. Defendant's attorneys made the hear-
say argument in response to plaintiff's attorneys' contention that defendant hospital's
incident reports should be admitted as routine business records, as exception to the hearsay
rule.
Hearsay Exceptions; Availability of Declarant Immaterial
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is
available as a witness:
Records of regularly conducted activity.
A memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in any form, of acts, events,
conditions, opinions, or diagnoses, made at or near the time by, or from information
transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if kept in the course of a regularly con-
ducted business activity, and if it was the regular practice of that business activity to
make the memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, all as shown by the
testimony of the custodian or other qualified witness, unless the source of informa-
tion or the method or circumstances of preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness.
The term "business" as used in this paragraph includes business, institution, associ-
ation, profession, occupation, and calling of every kind, whether or not conducted
for profit.
FED. R. EvID. 803(6).
Modern courts, however, generally admit medical records under the business records ex-
ceptions to the hearsay rule. Courts may also admit hospital incident reports into evidence
under the same rationale, although hospital attorneys argue earnestly that they are only pre-
pared in unusual circumstances. See, eg., Sims v. Knollwood Park Hosp., 511 So. 2d 154
(Ala. 1987) (denying attorney-client privilege for incident reports prepared routinely when-
ever litigation was anticipated, not for specific litigation); Kay Labs., Inc. v. Dist. Ct., 653
P.2d 721 (Colo. 1982) (hospital reports made for insurance company on its form within hours
of incident held discoverable).
However, some courts have held that hearsay statements made in the course of business
which do not relate to the treatment or medical history of a patient are not admissible. See,
eg., Commonwealth v. Hosey, 359 N.E.2d 1316, 1319 (Mass. App. 1977); Mikel v. Flatbush
Gen. Hosp., 370 N.Y.S.2d 162, 165 (1975) (holding that third parties' opinions as to how a
patient's accident occurred, although noted in the medical record, were inadmissible hear-
say). See also Picker X-ray v. Frerker, 405 F.2d at 922, (incident reports are "hospital
records... which qualify as business records [citations omitted] but have no relationship to
future treatment of the particular patient" and are, therefore, privileged). The general rule is
that the more opinions the hospital documentary evidence contains, the less reliable it is, even
if it is routinely prepared.
"T]here is a point at which opinion evidence ... as to how accidents occurred will be
objectionable." Skogen v. Dow Chem. Co., 375 F.2d 692, 704 (8th Cir. 1967) (overruled by
Manko v. US., 636 F. Supp. 1419 (W.D. Mo. 1986)). See also Picker X-ray, 405 F.2d at 922-
23 (remarking that the incident report is less reliable than other medical records because it
does not pertain to future treatment).
In the modern hospital, incident reports are routinely prepared in response to both the
external pressure from insurers and hospital accreditation authorities such as JCAHO. See
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they are not privileged attorney work product.4" Applying the doc-
trine of privilege to incident reports, however, would preserve both
supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text for a reference to routine preparation of incident
reports. They are also mandated by the internal pressure of management and quality assur-
ance auditors and committees. See FIESTA, supra note 15 at 174-75, COURNOYER supra note
17; Gumo, supra note 16, at 104-5 (discussing uses of incident reports for internal risk man-
agement and quality assurance and for external legal loss control). Incident reports, there-
fore, neatly fit within the business records exception to the hearsay rule and so generally they
are treated like an admission for evidentiary purposes.
Because cases denying admissibility to incident reports under the hearsay argument are
the exception to the rule, the hearsay rule does not offer the guarantee of confidentiality
necessary to promote the degree of open communication essential to making hospital incident
reports useful in improving the quality of care and reducing hospital losses. Unless a special
privilege is created to protect them, or they are denied admission because they are offered as
evidence of negligence because their purpose is to implement corrective measures, uncertainty
persists as to whether or not hospital incident reports are admissible and uncertainty discour-
ages full disclosure.
48. Recently, courts have rejected a work product immunity theory and have begun to
allow the discoverability of hospital incident reports. Work product immunity is a qualified
privilege which protects trial preparation materials from discovery. See Hickman v. Taylor,
329 U.S. 495 (1947). The burden of proof is on the party requesting discovery to demonstrate
"substantial need" for the factual materials discovered by the attorney, and to demonstrate
that obtaining the materials from any other source would be extremely difficult ("undue
hardship") before the court will compel discovery. FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b)(3); See Hickman,
329 U.S. at 511-12; see, eg., Bird v. Penn Central Co., 61 F.R.D. 43, 46 (E.D. Pa. 1973)
(finding that the attorney's work product was discoverable because substantial need and an
inability to obtain its equivalent by other means was shown by the moving party); see also
Stephen McG. Bundy & Einer R. Elhauge, Do Lawyers Improve the Adversary System?, 79
CAL. L. REV. 313, 401 (1991). But see Kevin M. Clermont, Surveying Work Product, 68
CORNELL L. REv. 755, 758-59 (1983); Thomas W. Hyland & Andrea E. Forman, The Corpo-
rate Attorney-Client Privilege, N.Y. STATE BAR J., Dec. 1990 at 17, 17 (discussing the higher
threshold for opinion and "strategy" information).
Rule 26(bX3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states:
A party may obtain discovery of documents and tangible things otherwise discover-
able ... and prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another party
or by or for that party's representative (including the other party's attorney, con-
sultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer, or agent) only upon a showing that the party
seeking discovery has substantial need of the materials in the preparation of the
party's case and that the party is unable without undue hardship to obtain the sub-
stantial equivalent of the materials by other means. In ordering discovery of such
materials when the required showing has been made, the court shall protect against
disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an
attorney or other representative of a party concerning the litigation.
FED. R. Civ. P 26(b)(3) (codifying the definition of work product as established in Upjohn v.
United States, 449 U.S. 383, 397-98 (1981)). The Hickman court had included both tangible
and intangible probative information such as the attorney's thoughts. 329 U.S. at 497. Some
commentators literally interpret Rule 26(b)(3) to require a three-part test to be met before
information meets the definition of work product. Jeff A. Anderson et al., Note, The Work
Product Doctrine, 68 CORNELL L. REv. 760, 792 (1983). "The materials must be: 1. 'docu-
ments and tangible things'; 2. 'prepared in advance of litigation or for trial'; and 3. 'by or for
another party or for that other party's representative.'" Id. A majority of courts utilize
some form of this three-pronged test in analyzing whether an incident report is work product.
See, eg., Payne v. Howard, 75 F.R.D. 465 (D.D.C. 1977); Hospital Corp. of America v.
Dixon, 330 So. 2d 737 (Fla. 1976); Sims v. Knollwood, 511 So. 2d 154 (Ala. 1987); Kay Labs.
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of the beneficial objectives of the incident report: alerting the attor-
v. District Court, 653 P.2d 721 (Colo. 1982); State ex rel Faith Hosp. v. Enright, 706 S.W.2d
852 (Mo. 1986).
Defendants' attorneys have difficulty arguing that incident reports fit the three-pronged
test. An incident report is a tangible document, often a preprinted form provided by the
hospital attorney or insurer, which readily meets the first prong. However, courts have dif-
fered on the interpretation of the second and third prongs of the test. See, eg., White v. New
York City Health & Hosps. Corp., No. 88 Civ. 7536, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3008 (S.D.N.Y.
1990) (finding that a preprinted incident report form was discoverable); Enke v. Anderson,
733 S.W.2d 462, 465 (Mo. 1987) (finding that a preprinted incident report form was privi-
leged).
The second prong of the work product privilege test is that the prospect of litigation must
be real and imminent. See Stephen A. Saltzburg, Corporate and Related Attorney-Client Pn'v-
ilege Claims, 12 HOFSTRA L. REv. 279, 306 n. 130 (1984) (citing United States v. Davis, 636
F.2d 1028, 1040 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 862 (1981); and In re Special Septem-
ber 1978 Grand Jury (1), 640 F.2d 49, 65 (7th Cir. 1980)); see also Sims, 511 So.2d at 157.
Liberal interpretation suggests that incident reports are prepared in anticipation of litigation
or for trial because they are prepared in response to an event which is likely to trigger suit.
See MONAGLE, supra note 22 at 29; Puetz, supra note 27, at 245 (discussing the purposes of
incident reports). Courts have required different degrees of likelihood of litigation for this
second prong. Some courts find that parties must merely meet a proximity requirement. See
Sims, 511 So.2d at 157 (quoting Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 604 (8th
Cir. 1977) ("the work product rule does not come into play merely because there is a remote
prospect of future litigation")). The proximity test as defined in 8 CHARLES A. WRIGHT &
ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 2024 (1969) is "whether, in
light of the nature of the document and the factual situation in the particular case, the docu-
ment can fairly be said to have been prepared or obtained [by the attorney] because of the
prospect of litigation." Other courts have held that an actual claim must already have been
made against the defendant. See Kay Labs., 653 P.2d at 722 (in denying work product privi-
lege to a hospital incident report prepared after a patient was chemically burned by a defec-
tive ice pack, the court declared that privileged material must be prepared with specific
litigation in mind). The timing of the litigation, therefore, may be crucial to a privilege argu-
ment under work product theory.
Another difficulty in determining whether or not the incident report can meet the second
prong of the work product immunity test is whether preparation for litigation is the sole
purpose of the report. Incident reports serve another purpose in addition to informing the
attorney. For example, reports which serve both a business function in the routine course of
hospital activities (risk management and quality assurance could be considered part of hospi-
tal routine) and a legal function to alert the attorney to possible future litigation have been
denied the work product privilege by some courts. See, eg., Clark v. Norris, 734 P.2d 182
(Mont. 1987) (denying hospital incident reports be automatically privileged due to their dual
purpose: trial preparation and internal risk management). Some courts insist upon a singu-
lar purpose for the incident report; it may only be prepared in anticipation of a legal claim,
not for quality assurance functions. See Sierra Vista Hosp. v. Shaffer, 56 Cal Rptr. 387, 388
(1967) (citing D.I. Chadbourne, Inc. v. Superior Court, 388 P.2d 700, 737 (Cal. 1964) (hold-
ing where there is more than one intended purpose for the report, the "dominant purpose"
will determine whether or not it is privileged)). Therefore, the second prong presents two
hurdles: the imminence of litigation and the singularity of purpose.
The third prong of the work product privilege test is also a stumbling block. Some courts
have held that incident reports may meet the third prong because they are prepared for the
health care provider's representative, including some or all of the following: the insurer's
counsel, in-house counsel, the risk management consultant, and the quality assurance con-
sultant. See, eg., Sierra Vista Hosp., 56 Cal Rptr. at 387; Enke, 733 S.W.2d at 466;
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ney of potential problems which could generate a lawsuit and alert-
ing those responsible for improving health care standards of
situations they can work to correct.49
MONAGLE, supra note 22, at 28. However, courts have not universally agreed that incident
reports meet the third prong representative requirement. For example, the Alabama
Supreme Court rejected the hospital defense attorney's work product theory in Sims v. Knoll-
wood. This case involved a patient who sustained a hip fracture after a fall from his bed. The
Court applied the arguments of the landmark work-product doctrine case, Hickman v. Tay-
lor, to deny privilege for the incident report. Sims, 511 So. 2d at 157. (citing Hickman v.
Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947)). "The written statement of a witness, whether prepared by him
and later delivered to the attorney, or drafted by the attorney and adopted by the witness, is
not properly considered the 'work product' of an attorney. It records the mental impressions
and observations of the witness himself and not those of the attorney." Scourtes v. Fred W.
Albrecht Grocery Co., 15 F.R.D. 55, 58 (N.D. Ohio 1953).
Courts and legal scholars have difficulty in establishing threshold qualifications to deter-
mine which of the various tangible and intangible materials should be immunized from dis-
covery. See Clermont, supra, at 762-763 (declaring that "work product protection is the most
frequently litigated discovery issue" as a consequence of its ambiguity). The presumption
favors discoverability and most "courts and commentators generally agree that the privilege
should be narrowly interpreted." Gwenn Mayers, The Second Circuit Restricts Evidentiary
Privileges for Corporate Communications 49 BROOK L. REv. 1103, 1105 (1983). In other
corporate contexts, the courts have been more liberal in balancing the substantial hardship of
the opposing party against the defense attorney's desire to protect the materials. See
Moldovan, supra at 828. Even the more liberal courts, however, have implied that different
materials would more likely be privileged such as the attorney's own impressions from the
interviews. Id. Further, his internal memoranda are more likely to be privileged than "ques-
tionnaires filled out in the employee's own words." Id. The presumption always favors dis-
covery for the policy reasons enunciated in Hickman v. Taylor. "We agree ... that the
deposition-discovery rules are to be accorded a broad and liberal treatment .... Mutual
knowledge of all the relevant facts gathered by both parties is essential to proper litigation,"
Caroline T. Mitchell, Note, The Work Product Doctrine in Subsequent Litigation, 83 COLUM.
L. REV. 412, 414 (1983) (quoting Hickman, 329 U.S. at 507). Although this undercuts the
case for hospital incident report privilege, since hospital incident reports are often in ques-
tionnaire format, the format and standards for preparation of the reports could be, and their
primary purposes remain in notifying the hospital attorney of potential litigation and improv-
ing the quality of health care. See infra Sec. IV. A-1.
Because of the difficulties courts create by narrowly and inconsistently interpreting the
three prong test of work product privilege, health care workers are unable to determine with
certainty whether incident reports will be privileged or not. Hospital employees cannot know
in advance how likely litigation will be, so they cannot depend on work product immunity to
protect what they reveal in the incident reports. Full disclosure of information is inhibited by
the uncertainty. Work product immunity, however, is not the best argument for keeping
incident reports out of the hands of plaintiff's attorneys. Attorney-client confidentiality and
health care enhancement are.
49. See Sherman L. Cohn, The Work Product Doctrine: Protection Not Privilege, 71
GEO. L. J. 917, 919 (1983) (discussing two important goals of the adversary system which
would be thwarted by compelled discovery: "full preparation and zealous advocacy"). The
hospital attorney's ability to prepare for potential claims so that she may zealously defend her
client the hospital is impaired if she is not alerted to the problem by an incident report pre-
pared soon after the event occurred. The attorney's advice may not be effective if it is based
on retrospective or incomplete accounts of events, and the hospital may be subject to further
liability if the same incidents continue to occur.
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III. TWO COMPELLING ARGUMENTS FOR HOSPITAL
INCIDENT REPORT PRIVILEGE: ATTORNEY-
CLIENT CONFIDENTIALITY AND
HEALTH CARE QUALITY
IMPROVEMENT
Privileges between attorney and client are necessary when there
is a strong societal interest in encouraging "clients to make full dis-
closure to their attorneys,"50 such as the interest in seeking the at-
torney's advice about whether the circumstances surrounding the
incident place the hospital at a liability risk. Privileges are often
differentiated by the discoverabilty (what is privileged from pretrial
discovery) and admissibility (what is privileged from admission into
evidence at trial),5" but once privilege from discovery is established,
it follows that the hospital incident report will be inadmissible be-
cause discoverability is the threshold for admissibility. 2 This Note
50. See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976) (quoted in Upjohn v. United
States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981)); Marshall Williams, The Scope of Attorney-Client Privilege
in View of Reason and Experience, 25 How. L.J. 425, supra note 48 at 436 n.53 (1982) (not-
ing that the public policy of protecting confidential communications is too well-known to
need extended comment). But see, Mitchell, supra note 48 at 415 (declaring that privileges
"do not in any wise aid in the ascertainment of truth, but rather they shut out the light.
Their sole warrant is the protection of interests and relationships which, rightly or wrongly,
are regarded as of sufficient social importance to justify some incidental sacrifice of sources of
facts needed in the administration ofjustice") (quoting CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, The Scope
of Privilege in the Law of Evidence, 16 TEx. L. REv. 447,447-48 (1938)). This note does not
defend the utility of privilege in general, but assumes that since they have proved to be valua-
ble in some contexts they will be useful in the health care context as well.
51. B. Abbott Goldberg, The Peer Review Privilege" A Law In Search of a Valid Policy,
10 Am. J. L. & MED. 151, 153 (1984) (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 26(bXl): "the general rule
[is] that discovery is not limited to admissible evidence but rather extends to the discovery of
information that is 'reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.'
Conversely, the fact that records are privileged from pretrial discovery does not require that
they be excluded at trial"). This was a critical distinction made by Florida statutes governing
privilege for risk management activities such as incident report preparation: "incident re-
ports 'shall be subject to discovery, but shall not be admissible as evidence in court." Talla-
hassee Memorial Medical Ctr. v. Meeks, 560 So. 2d 778 (Fla. 1990) (quoting FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 395.041(4) (1990)).
52. Discovery Scope and Limits.
Unless otherwise listed by order of the court in accordance with these rules, the
scope of discovery is as follows:
(1) In GeneraL Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privi-
leged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action,
whether it relates to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or to the
claim or defense of any other party, including the existence, description, nature,
custody, condition and location of any books, documents, or other tangible things
and the identity and location of persons having knowledge of any discoverable mat-
ter. It is not ground for objection that the information sought will be inadmissible
at the trial if the information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the
discovery of admissible evidence.
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argues for two distinct but individually valid privileges: the attor-
ney-client privilege 3 and a proposed quality assurance privilege
utilizing the peer review privilege model 5 and the subsequent repair
rule.
55
A. Attorney-Client Privilege
Attorney-client privilege, the "oldest of the interpersonal com-
munication privileges," 56 is a frequently-invoked argument favoring
privilege for hospital incident reports.5 7  Two main philosophies
support this privilege: the utilitarian theory58 and the rights ap-
proach.59  The utilitarian theory espouses a balancing test which
pits the societal benefit of non-disclosure against the harm to the
judicial fact-finder. 6 The rights approach holds that in some in-
stances it is simply wrong to compel theses types of confidential
communications because of the importance of preserving the right
of the parties to believe that what they communicate to their attor-
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
53. Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or pro-
vided by Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to
statutory authority, the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or polit-
ical subdivision thereof shall be governed by the principles of the common law as
they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and
experience. However, in civil actions and proceedings with respect to an element of
a claim or defense as to which State law supplies the rule of decision, the privilege of
a witness, person, government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be deter-
mined in accordance with State law.
FED. R. EviD. 501.
54. See infra § III(BXI) for discussion of the medical peer review committee privilege.
55. Subsequent remedial measures
When, after an event, measures are taken which, if taken previously, would have
made the event less likely to occur, evidence of the subsequent measures is not
admissible to prove negligence or culpable conduct in connection with the event.
This rule does not require the exclusion of evidence of subsequent measures when
offered for another purpose, such as proving ownership, control, or feasibility of
precautionary measures, if controverted, or impeachment.
FED. R. EvD. 407.
56. Note, Developments--Prvileged Communications, 98 HARv. L. REv. 1450, 1501
(1985).
57. See eg., Sims v. Knollwood Park Hosp., 511 So. 2d 154, 156 (Ala. 1987); Clark v.
Norris, 734 P. 2d 182, 186 (Mont. 1987); Enke v. Anderson, 733 S.W. 2d 462,464 (Mo. App.
1987); State ex rel. Children's Medical Ctr. v. Brown, 571 N.E. 2d 724, 726 (Ohio 1991); In
re Death of Francis v. St. Thomas Hosp., No. 8556, slip op. (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 7, 1977).
58. See Michael L. Waldman, Beyond Upjohn: The Attorney-Client Privilege in the Cor-
porate Context, 28 WM. & MARY L. REv. 473, 479 (1987).
59. See Note, supra note 56, at 1501 n.6.
60. See Waldman, supra note 58, at 479. For further description of the utilitarian ap-
proach to attorney-cient privilege, see Note, supra note 56, at 1502.
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neys will remain confidential.6 1
The attorney-client privilege is absolute and protects only the
confidential communications between the client and the attorney.62
It "is designed to 'facilitate the administration of justice' by encour-
aging full and open communications between the client and the at-
torney. '63 Because it is absolute, the attorney-client privilege may
only be invoked when certain criteria are met. 6  Some state courts
have applied stringent "prerequisites" for the attorney-client privi-
lege.65 For example, in Louisiana, as in most jurisdictions, to meet
the attorney-client privilege test, there must be an established rela-
tionship between the attorney and the client, the communication
must have been given in confidence, and the communication must
be "sufficiently connected to the subject matter of the attorney's
representation." 66
The fact that the communication went to a number of persons
sometimes defeats the attorney-client privilege. Some courts have
ruled that incident reports are not confidential communications be-
cause they are made under the direction of the hospital's internal
administration, not just the attorney, and the reports are delivered
to hospital administrators and insurers.67 Courts denying attorney-
client privilege to hospital incident reports have also declared that
there can be no communication until it has been received by the
61. See Note, supra note 56, at 1501 n.3 (citing 91 HARv. L. REV. 464, 465 (1977) and 2
D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 201, at 417 (1978)).
62. Mayers, supra note 48, at 1103.
63. Mayers, supra note 48, at 1104-05 (citing Natta v. Hogan, 392 F. 2d 686, 691 (10th
Cir. 1968); citing Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470 (1888)).
64. See Richard L. Marcus, The Perils of Privilege: Waiver & The Litigator, 84 MICH. L.
REv. 1605, 1605 (1986) (citing 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIAL AT COMMON LAW
§ 2292, at 554 (J. McNaughton ed. 1961):
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal advisor in
his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that purpose, (4) made in
confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his instance permanently protected (7) from
disclosure by himself or the legal advisor, (8) except the protection be waived.
See also, Merton E. Marks, The Attorney-Client Privilege and the Work Product Doctrine in
the Corporate Setting, F.I.C.C. Q., Fall 1990 (stated five elements required to establish the
attorney-client privilege).
65. See eg., Robert Force & Kerry J. Triche, The Current State of Evidentiary Privileges
in Louisiana, 49 LA. L. REV. 733, 752 (1989) (though making reference to criminal stan-
dards, the author describes little more flexibility in the civil standard).
66. Id. at 752-53.
67. Eg., In re Death of Francis, supra note 57 (holding that the incident reported was
not privileged as a confidential attorney-client communication although hospital personnel
made the incident report immediately after the death of the patient and forwarded it to a
hospital director, who photocopied and only disbursed it to two hospital attorneys); Bernardi
v. Community Hosp. As'n, 443 P. 2d 7080, 715-16 (Colo. 1968) (unsuccessfully arguing for
attorney-client privilege for hospital incident reports).
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attorney. 8 Other courts have accepted hospitals' arguments that
because the reports are not included in the medical record, and are
oftentimes forwarded directly to the hospital's or malpractice insur-
ance carrier's attorney, or both, the reports constitute confidential
communication between the hospital and its lawyers.69 This is the
better view, because otherwise the hospital might choose to give it
only to the attorney, foiling the quality improvement purpose to
preserve the attorney-client privilege.
The attorney-client privilege argument for hospital incident re-
ports is modeled on corporate attorney-client privilege cases. The
corporate attorney-client privilege developed because the pure at-
torney-client privilege protected from compelled disclosure only
confidential communications between the client and the lawyer; it
did not extend to information the attorney obtained from other par-
ties.70 Where a corporation is the client, uncertainty exists as to
whose communication is protected.71
Courts have formulated various tests to determine who is a priv-
ileged party.72 Formerly courts restricted privilege to the "control
group," the corporation's managers and executives with authority
to direct corporate activity.73 The focus of the control test was on
privilege for the individuals who personified the corporation,74 as
opposed to treating the corporation as the privileged person. How-
ever, the control group test stifled open communication between
lower level employees and the corporation's attorney because any
such information could be used against these employees to demon-
68. Bernardi, 443 P. 2d at 715-16. There could be no privileged communication without
receipt of the communication by the attorney.
69. See, eg., Sierra Vista Hosp. v. Shaffer, 56 Cal. Rptr. 387 (1967) (applying Cal. Civ.
Proc. Code §§ 2031, 2016(b); Cal Evid. Code § 952); Sfigar v. Tucker, 267 So. 2d 54 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1972) (two cases successfully arguing for attorney-client privilege for hospital
incident reports).
70. See Bundy & Elhauge, supra note 48.
71. See Note, The Attorney-Client Pr'vilege and the Corporate Client: Where Do We Go
After Upjohn?, 81 MIcH. L. REv. 665, 667-68 (1983); Saltzburg, supra note 48, at 280-81
(discussing the two competing approaches for determining whose communications are privi-
leged); Williams, supra note 50, at 439 (noting the difficulties in ascertaining whose communi-
cations on behalf of the corporation are privileged).
72. See, e-g., Waldman, supra note 58; Williams, supra note 50; Note, supra note 56;
Saltzburg, supra note 48; Marks, supra note 64 (discussing the various corporate attorney-
client privilege tests).
73. See Marks, supra note 64, at 86 n.7; Hyland & Forman, supra note 48, at 18 (dis-
cussing Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 210 F. Supp 483 (E.D. Pa. 1962)).
74. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 390 (citing General Elec. Co. v. Kirkpat-
rick, 312 F. 2d 742 (3rd Cir. 1962), cert. denied 372 U.S. 943 (1963)).
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strate personal liability.7 5 Since the control group test focused on
who was communicating rather than the subject matter of the com-
munication, it undercut the policies underlying privilege.7 6
The "subject matter" test, on the other hand, extends the privi-
lege vertically to other corporate employees in addition to upper
management.7 7 The test creates an agency privilege and encourages
disclosure of all information necessary for legal decision-making as
long as the employee is directed by his superiors to make the confi-
dential communication, and the subject matter of the communica-
tion is within the scope of the employee's duties.78 Although the
subject matter test does not restrict the discovery of ordinary busi-
ness records, 79 courts have criticized its potential for creating a
"zone of silence" when corporate managers direct employees to fil-
ter all sensitive information through the attorney. 0
The Duplan test, a hybrid of the control group and subject mat-
ter tests, limits privilege to the control group, but extends the con-
trol group to include "any corporate employee, agent or
representative involved in rendering information necessary to the
decision-making process regarding [a particular] problem."'" The
Duplan requirements differ from the subject matter requirements in
that the person communicating with the attorney does not have to
be doing so within the scope of employment duties.8 2 The Duplan
75. See, ag., Saltzburg, supra note 48, at 281.
76. See Williams, supra note 48, at 441. See also Waldman, supra note 58, at 485 for a
discussion of the Hobson's Choice corporate attorneys faced under the control group test.
77. See Hyland & Forman, supra note 48, at 18. The requirements for subject matter
corporate attorney-client privilege are: "(1) the communication must be made for the pur-
pose of securing legal advice; (2) the employee making the communication must do so at the
direction of his superior; (3) the direction was given by the superior to obtain legal advice for
the corporation; (4) the subject matter of the communication must be within the scope of the
employees corporate duties and (5) the communication is not disseminated beyond those per-
sons who need to know." Id. (citing Diversified Industries Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596,
609 (8th Cir. 1978) (en banc)). The subject matter test is also referred to as the scope of
employment test and the Harper & Row test. Saltzburg, supra note 48, at 289; Williams,
supra note 50, at 243.
78. Williams, supra note 50, at 442.
79. Hyland & Forman, supra note 48, at 18.
80. See Note, supra note 71, at 676 n.38 (citing United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F. 2d
530, 541 (5th Cir. 1982); Susan A. Moldovan, The Attorney-Client Relationship in the Corpo-
rate Organization, 46 BROOK. L. REv. 803, 809 (1980) (discussing the abuses that result from
a broad application of the privilege. See also Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F. 2d
596 (8th Cir. 1978) (applying a modified Harper and Row, supra note 77, subject-matter test
to determine whether communication is protected by attorney-client privilege).
81. Williams, supra note 50, at 444-45 (emphasis omitted) (discussing the test applied in
Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 397 F. Supp 1146, 1165 (D.S.C. 1974).
82. Williams, supra note 50, at 446.
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test avoids the broad "zone of silence" created by the subject matter
test, because only communications related to the specific legal prob-
lem at issue are privileged. 3 Since the Duplan test focused on the
particular problem, not the status of the particular person providing
the information about it, more low-level personnel are encouraged
to communicate with the attorney.
4
The "modified subject matter" test, as defined by the Eighth
Circuit in Diversified Industries, Inc. v. Meredith,"5 predicates cor-
porate attorney-client privilege on more restrictive standards than
the subject matter/scope of employment test.86 The corporate em-
ployee's confidential communication must meet the following con-
ditions for the attorney-client privilege to apply: 7
(1) the communication was made for the purpose of securing
legal advise; (2) the employee making the communication did so
at the direction of his corporate superior; (3) the superior made
the request so that the corporation could secure legal advice; (4)
the subject matter of the communication is within the scope of
the employee's corporate duties; and (5) the communication is
not disseminated beyond those persons who, because of the cor-
porate structure, need to know its contents.88
Although it has been praised for narrowing and clarifying the attor-
ney-client privilege, the modified subject matter test has been criti-
cized for thwarting the purpose of privilege.8 9 Lower-level
employees will not be free to disclose information to the attorney
unless they have been commanded to do so by their superiors; if the
communication may only be made for the purpose of securing legal
advice, the scope of the information revealed will also be limited.'
None of the tests resolves all the differences of interpretation
about which communications qualify for the attorney-client privi-
lege. In the Upjohn case, the Supreme Court expressly denounced
the "control group" standard, but did not recommend a preferred
83. Id
84. Id at 445.
85. 572 F. 2d 596, 609 (8th Cir. 1978). See Note, supra note 71, at 676.
86. See Williams, supra note 50, at 446-49 (discussing what it labelled as the "Modified
Harper & Row Test"); Note, supra note 71, at 676-83; see also Saltzburg, supra note 48, at
290-91 (stating "[t]he court endeavored to restate the scope of employment test to assure that
the privilege did not provide corporations with a device to hide information under the guise
of seeking legal advice").
87. See Note, supra note 71, at 677 n.43.
88. Meredith, 572 F. 2d at 609 (citing WEINsTEIN & M. BERGER, 2 WEINSTEIN'S EVI-
DENCE § 503(b)(04) (1975)).
89. See Note, supra note 71, at 677.
90. Ia4
HEALTH MATRIX
alternative test for corporate attorney-client privilege. 91 Upjohn
suggested a case-by-case analysis to determine which communica-
tions by which persons in the corporate context are privileged;92
however, the unpredictable outcome of this approach undermines
uninhibited disclosure.93
Courts have applied the corporate attorney-client privilege tests
to hospital incident reports, with varying outcomes.94 For example,
in Enke v. Anderson 9, the Missouri appellate court held that an
incident report prepared by a nurse to document the fall of an unat-
tended patient who had just been medicated was privileged from
discovery though it was sent to the hospital's insurer.96 After ana-
lyzing the mixed precedent within the jurisdiction, 97 the court uti-
lized a standard much like the Duplan test, declaring that "[t]he
hospital, as an insured, could act only through its employees." 9 In
Clark v. Norris,9 9 the Montana Supreme Court denied attorney-cli-
ent privilege to an incident report prepared by an operating room
nurse to document that a patient sustained a perforated uterus and
intestinal damage during a routine dilation and curettage ("D and
C")."o The Clark court rejected the subject matter, Duplan, and
modified subject matter tests, proclaiming that it did not matter
that the report was made at the direction of the corporation and
that its subject matter was within the scope of the maker's employ-
ment; the significant factor in determining whether the privilege ap-
plies, in the court's view, is thepurpose of the report.101 The court
was not convinced that the incident report in question was intended
91. Upjohn Co., supra note 48, at 393-97.
92. Id. at 396.
93. See Waldman, supra note 58; Note, supra note 71 (discussing the lack of certainty as
to a corporate attorney-client privilege standard after Upjohn).
94. See Ellen K. Murphey, Incident Reports May or May Not Be Privileged Information,
51 AORN (Am. Operating Room Nurses) Journal 851 (1990) (illustrating how different
states reach different conclusions).
95. 733 S.W. 2d 462 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
96. Id. at 469.
97. The Enke court adopted the pro-attorney-client privilege status accorded incident
reports in State ex rel Cain v. Barker, 540 S.W. 2d 50 (Mo. 1976) and May Dept. Stores Co.
v. Ryan, 699 S.W. 2d 134 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985) after distinguishing the anti-incident report
privilege opinions of State ex rel Faith Hosp. v. Enright, 706 S.W. 2d 852 (Mo. 1986) and St.
Louis Little Rock Hosp., Inc. v. Gaertner, 682 S.W. 2d 146 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984). Enke, 733
S.W. 2d at 465-68.
98. Enke, 733 S.W.2d at 468.
99. 734 P.2d 182 (Mont. 1987).
100. Id. at 184.
101. Id. at 187 (citing Sierra Vista Hosp. v. Superior Ct. 56 Cal. Rptr. 387, 392 (1967)).
The Colorado court also emphasized the singular purpose requirement in Bernardi v. Com-
munity Hosp. Ass'n, 443 P.2d 708, 710 (Colo. 1968).
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to be a confidential communication to the hospital attorney pre-
pared in anticipation of litigation, because it served dual purposes:
internal quality control and preparation of litigation."02
Because courts adopt different attorney-client privilege tests,
and apply these tests inconsistently to hospital incident reports,
health care workers cannot be certain that what they disclose in
incident reports will be kept confidential. When the reports serve
more than one purpose, even if both purposes serve important poli-
cies, the privilege is uncertain. Consequently, hospital employees,
may choose not to reveal useful information to hospital attorneys,
liability insurers, risk managers and quality assurance personnel.
Or, they may choose to reveal it only to the attorney, defeating the
quality improvement purpose. Either way, unpredictability of at-
torney-client privilege for hospital incident reports will produce the
same results as no privilege ar all. Uncertainty will deter hospital
employees from full disclosure of information which could be used
to assist the attorney in advising the hospital to prevent future
losses.
B. Quality Assurance Privilege
As important as the policies for attorney-client privilege for hos-
pital incident reports are, the justifications for a quality assurance
privilege are even more compelling. Quality assurance personnel
need to know witness' impressions and opinions about accidents
and potentially dangerous situations to increase efficiency and safety
among the staff and the overall quality of care for patients and visi-
tors, just as attorneys need to know the same information to reduce
hospital losses from lawsuits. Generally, the quality assurance com-
mittee of a hospital consists of the hospital's in-house counsel, doc-
tors and nurses from various specialties, pharmacy and
maintenance/engineering representatives, and a professional risk
manager with liability insurance education."0 3 The quality review
process allows trained personnel to analyze incident report data for
negative trends and to make recommendations to hospital employ-
ees who work directly in the particular areas where the problems
are. These people closest to the situation can implement corrective
action based on dispassionate criticism. The quality assurance com-
102. Clark, 734 P.2d at 187.
103. See JOINT COMMISSION MANUAL FOR ACCREDITATION OF HEALTHCARE ORGA-
NIZATIONS, AMH ACCREDITATION MANUAL (1992) (listing the composition of the quality
improvement committee); CARROLL, supra note 30 (discussing who typically serves on the
committees).
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mittee's work benefits hospital staff because it provides them with
useful feedback to improve their skill. Neutral evaluators often
identify problems and solutions more readily than those who work
in the problem areas because they independently review a variety of
data and incident reports. The quality monitoring and improve-
ment process is much more effective if the information sent to the
committee is candid and thorough. Health care workers are much
more likely to provide complete incident reports if they are certain
that the information will be kept confidential by the quality assur-
ers, much as information used in medical peer review committees is
kept confidential by members of those committees.
1. Medical Peer Review Committee Privilege:
The medical peer review committee privilege protects physicians
who evaluate each other from defamation liability."° The peer re-
view privilege has been almost universally recognized by the courts,
and is statutorily mandated in some states.105 Because candor is
essential to the physicians' evaluation process, and states have a
compelling interest in ensuring a high standard of professionalism
in the medical community, 106 states created statutes to protect the
confidential communications of health care personnel in the review
process."07 The medical peer review committee has been broadly
defined to include:
a committee... of a medical staff of a licensed hospital or nurs-
ing home.. .which committee has as its function the evaluation
or improvement of the quality of health care rendered by provid-
ers of health care services ... were performed in compliance with
104. See Bredice v. Doctors Hosp., Inc., 51 F.R.D. 187 (D.D.C. 1970) (noting the pur-
pose of peer review privilege in encouraging professional criticism).
105. See, eg., Hendrickson v. Leipzig, 715 F. Supp. 1443 (E.D. Ark. 1989); Laws v.
Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 656 F. Supp. 824 (D.D.C. 1987); Bredice v. Doctor's Hosp., Inc.,
157 F.R.D. 187 (D.D.C. 1970); Shelton v. Morehead Memorial Hosp., 347 S.E. 2d 824 (N.C.
1986); statutes: ARK. CODE AN. § 16-46-105 (Michie 1990); N.C. GEN. STAT. tit. 5
§ 131E-76(5) (1992) (North Carolina Hospital Licensure Act); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 395.011(a) (West 1986 & Supp. 1988); MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 14.15(21513) (1986); CAL.
EVID. CODE § 1157; ILL. REV. STAT. 1985, ch. 110, para. 8-2101; N.Y. Civ PRAc. L. & R.
§ 3101 (Console 1991); KAN. STAT. AN. § 65-4915 (1990); OHio REV. CODE ANN.
§ 23205.251 (Baldwin 1991). See generally, Charles D. Creech, Comment, The Medical Re-
view Committee Privilege: A Jurisdictional Survey, 67 N.C.L. REv. 179 (1988) (discussing the
recognition and application of the peer review committee privilege as adopted by 46 different
states).
106. See Dorsten v. Lapeer County Gen. Hosp., 88 F.R.D. 583, 585-86 (E.D. Mich.
1980) (quoting Bredice v. Doctors Hosp., Inc., 51 F.R.D. 187 (D.D.C. 1970). The Bredice
court declared that "candid and conscientious evaluation of clinical practices is the sine qua
non of adequate health care." Id
107. See Creech, supra note 105, at 185-86.
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the applicable standards of care, the determination whether the
cost of health care services rendered... was considered reason-
able by the providers of health services in the area, the determi-
nation of whether a health care provider's actions call into
question such health care provider's fitness to provide health care
services, or the evaluation and assistance of health care providers
impaired or allegedly impaired by reason of alcohol, drugs, phys-
ical disability, mental instability or otherwise.'0 8
Committees with these functions include "Patient Care Audit Com-
mittees, Medical Care Evaluation Committees, Utilization Review
Committees, Credential Committees, and Executive Commit-
tees." 9 The rationales for maintaining the confidentiality of com-
munications made in peer review committees by physicians
evaluating their colleagues are the same rationales hospital attor-
neys use to argue for incident report privilege: the need for open
and honest assessment of practices and procedures to promote bet-
ter health care without risk of personal liability.110 Peer review ac-
tivities for quality assurance purposes are required by law for
hospitals receiving federal reimbursement. 11 Accrediting agencies,
such as JCAHCO, also require peer review by medical staff as a
condition for accreditation.'1 2 Some states statutorily mandate peer
review activities for quality assurance and risk management." 3 The
ultimate goal of these statutes, reimbursement requirements, and
accrediting regulations, in every case, is improvement of patient
care. 114
108. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN., ch. III § I (West 1986).
109. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 8-2101 (1992).
110. See Creech, supra note 105, at 179; Goldberg, supra note 51, at 151; Niven v. Si-
queira, 487 N.E.2d 937, 942 (1985) (noting the objective of statutory peer review privilege "is
to encourage candid voluntary studies and programs used to improve hospital conditions and
patient care or to reduce the rates of death and disease").
111. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1395x(e), 1395(k) (West 1982 & Supp. 1992).
112. See JOINT COMMISSION ON ACCREDITATION OF HEALTHCARE ORGANIZATIONS,
AMH ACCREDITATION MANUAL FOR HOSPITALS, Standards MS.1, MS.6 (1990).
113. See, eg., MAss. GEN. LAWS, ch. 112 § 5 (1986) (placing an "'affirmative duty' on
each health care provider to report 'injuries and incidents' to the facility's Patient Care As-
sessment Coordinator." (cited in Beth Israel Hosp. Ass'n v. Board of Registration in
Medicine, 515 N.E.2d 574, 575 (Mass. 1987)); WASH. REv. CODE, ch. 70.41.230 (1990);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 395.011 (West 1986 & Supp 1983); MICH. STATE. ANN. § 14.15(21513)
(Callaghan 1988); NEB. REv. STAT. § 71-2046 (1990).
114. Because it provides an absolute shelter to physicians from defamatory liability (see,
eg., Niven v. Siqueira, 487 N.E.2d 937 (Ill. 1985) (holding peer review reports absolutely
privileged). But see, Cameron v. New Hanover Memorial, 293 S.E. 2d 901 (N.C. 1982)
(granting privilege to medical review committee, the court declared that the privilege which
was qualified and only attached to communications made in good faith); Dorsten v. Lapeer
County Gen. Hosp., 88 F.R.D. 583 (E.D. Mich. 1980) (denying absolute privilege which had
been granted by state statute to a physician's employment discrimination suit brought under
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Some courts recognize that incident reports serve the same pur-
pose in improving health care as peer review committee reports and
that they deserve the same protection from discovery in order to
encourage the candor necessary to promote better patient care.'
15
An Arkansas court extended the medical review privilege to include
hospital reports from a "quality-care committee" which had disci-
plined a nurse after the death of an infant.1 16 In Gallagher v. De-
troit-Macomb Hospital Association, 7 a Michigan court held that
because "hospitals are required to review their professional prac-
tices and procedures to improve the quality of patient care and re-
duce morbidity and mortality,""1 8 under Michigan law, an incident
report which was forwarded to the hospital safety committee after a
patient fell from bed was privileged from discovery. 1 9 Judge Cor-
federal law), some courts narrowly construe their interpretations of statutory peer review
committee privilege to include only those statements made to a specially designated commit-
tee whose singular function is physician evaluation. See Gallagher v. Detroit-Macomb Hosp.
Ass'n., 431 N.W.2d 90 (Mich. 1988) (citing Marchand v. Henry Ford Hosp., 398 Mich. 163,
167 (1976) in which the court applied Michigan's Public Health Code to determine that
"[t]his privilege may only be invoked for records, data and knowledge collected for or by an
individual or committee assigned a review function"). See also John C. Lincoln Hosp. &
Health Ctr. v. Superior Court, 768 P. 2d 188 (Ariz. 1989) (granting privilege to peer review
and trauma committee reports but denying privilege to a "Quality Assurance Program Inci-
dent Report").
Others only grant privilege to confidential communications directly related to patient
care. See, eg., Dunkin v. Silver Cross Hosp., 573 N.E.2d 848 (Ill. 1991); Clark v. Norris, 734
P.2d 182 (Mont. 1986) (privilege of a document is limited by the purpose in requiring the
report). Incident reports describing accidents involving visitors and staff are not afforded the
same measure of confidentiality by these courts as those describing incidents affecting pa-
tients, and their subject matter is not considered to be privileged information. The courts
believed the purpose of the reports was to improve patient safety. Although the corrective
measures which would improve safety for staff and visitors might also improve care for pa-
tients, for example, patients often use the same stairways and walk on the same wet floors as
staff and visitors. Thus, the court felt it necessary to limit the scope of what might be consid-
ered privileged. Notwithstanding some courts have held "slip and fall" incident reports to be
privileged communications in a general corporate context (see, e.g., Sears Roebuck & Co. v.
Scott, 481 So.2d 968 (Fla. 1986); Payless Drug Stores, Inc. v. Sabido, 127 Cal. Rptr. 4
(1976)), this note confines the quality assurance privilege argument to incidents which are
found to directly impact patient care.
115. See Bredice v. Doctors Hosp., Inc., 50 F.R.D. 249 (D.D.C. 1970); Flannery v. Lin,
531 N.E.2d 403 (Il1. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that a code blue report prepared during the
resuscitation of an infant was privileged); infection control committee report case. See also
Laws v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 656 F. Supp. 824 (D.D.C. 1987) (extending privilege to
include the internal memorandum of a physician which discussed problems with the delivery
of a child).
116. National Bank of Commerce v. HCA Health Servs. of Midwest, Inc., 800 S.W.2d
694, 701 (Ark. 1990).
117. 431 N.W.2d 90 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988).
118. Id. at 93.
119. Id.
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coran of the D.C. Circuit Court made one of the eloquent public
policy arguments for extending peer review privilege to the reports
of other committees. 120 Arguing for confidentiality of hospital staff
meetings which were held to evaluate the causes of a patient's
death, he said, "[c]onfidentiality is essential to effective functioning
of these staff meetings; and these meetings are essential to the con-
tinued improvement in the care and treatment of patients." 21 He
further described confidentiality in this context as "an overwhelm-
ing public interest." '22 Health care workers would be more likely
to openly provide important information to these committees via
incident reports if confidentiality were consistently guaranteed by a
quality assurance privilege.
2. State Legislation Establishing Hospital Incident Report
Privilege
Several states have passed statutes specifically addressing privi-
lege for hospital reports other than those used for medical staff peer
review. 23 Some of these statutes specifically exclude incident re-
ports, placing them in the same category as documentation con-
tained within the medical record.12 Even where these medical peer
review committee privilege statutes provide specific language, such
as the privilege "shall not be construed to include incident reports,"
judges have sometimes differed as to whether an evaluative report,
prepared to prevent further accidents and to alert the attorney as to
a possible claim against the hospital, fits under the statutory section
denying privilege to routine documentation, or whether it more
closely fits in the same category as peer review reports.12 5
120. Bredice v. Doctors Hosp., Inc., 50 F.R.D. 249 (D.D.C. 1970), aff'd 51 F.R.D. 187
(D.D.C. 1970).
121. Id. at 250.
122. Id
123. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-46-105 (Michie 1990); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2305.251 (Baldwin 1991); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, par. 8-2101 (1985). These state stat-
utes mention other types of hospital reports besides the medical peer review committee
reports.
124. See, e.g., OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2305.251 (Baldwin 1991); ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 16-46-105 (Michie 1990).
125. See State, ex rel Children's Medical Ctr. v. Brown, 1990 Ohio App. LEXIS 3008,
April 12, 1990, rev'd 59 Ohio St. 3d 194 (1991) (the lower court interpreted the Ohio statute
to include privilege for hospital incident reports but this position was reversed by the supreme
court of Ohio); Flannery v. Lin, 531 N.E.2d 403 (Ill Ct. App. 1988) (granting privilege to a
"code blue" incident report under the Illinois peer review report privilege statute); John C.
Lincoln Hospital & Health Center v. Superior Ct. of Maricopa County, 768 P.2d 188 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1989) (refusing to equate an incident report with a peer review report for privilege
purposes).
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Some states expand medical committee peer review privilege to
include documents prepared with the intention of improving the
quality of health care.1 26 Other state statutes mandate risk manage-
ment programs as a condition for licensure of the hospital and do
not specifically deny hospital incident reports privilege, so courts
have been left to determine whether to broadly apply the state's
medical peer review report privilege or exclude privilege for hospital
incident reports.127 Confusion and differing judicial interpretation
even exists where standards for statutory interpretation have been
established.' 2  The statutes do not alleviate uncertainty for health
care workers as to whether or not their communications in incident
reports will remain confidential because the statutes have not put
forth a clear privilege model. State legislatures need to adopt a uni-
form statutory hospital incident report privilege to provide hospital
employees certainty that they may reveal their opinions to enhance
health care without the threat of liability.
3. Subsequent Remedial Measures
The strongest argument for denying opposing access to hospital
incident reports under a quality assurance privilege is the policy un-
derlying the subsequent repair rule (also known as the subsequent
remedial measure doctrine) of the rules of evidence: promoting
safety measures.1 29 The pertinent part of Federal Rule 407 states:
"When, after an event, measures are taken which, if taken previ-
ously, would have made the event less likely to occur, evidence of
the subsequent measures is not admissible to prove negligence or
culpable conduct in connection with the event."' 30 The common
126. See Illinois Medical Studies Act, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, para. 8-2101 (1992);
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 233, § 79 (Law. Co-op 1991).
127. See John C. Lincoln Health & Hosp. Ctr. v. Superior Court, 768 P.2d 188 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1989) (denying that peer review privilege protects quality assurance committee report);
Ekstrom v. Temple, 553 N.E.2d 424 (Ill. Ct. App. 1990) (denying that peer review committee
privilege protects infection committee report).
128. See, eg., Flannery v. Lin, 531 N.E.2d 403 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988) (interpreting the
Illinois Medical Studies Act to extend privilege to a variety of hospital incident reports used
in improving the quality of care); Niven v. Siqueira, 487 N.E.2d 937 (Ill. 1985); Sakosko v.
Memorial Hosp., 552 N.E.2d 273 (111. App. Ct. 1988). But see Ekstrom v. Temple, 553
N.E.2d 424 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (interpreting the same Illinois statute to deny privilege to any
incident reports other than narrowly defined peer review committee reports); Willing v. St.
Joseph Hospital, 531 N.E.2d 824 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988).
129. FED. R. EVID. 407 advisory committee's note.
130. FED. R. EVID. 407. The second sentence contains the limitations on the exclusion:
"This rule does not require the exclusion of evidence of subsequent measures when offered for
another purpose, such as proving ownership, control, or feasibility of precautionary meas-
ures, if controverted, or impeachment."
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law rule (codified in FED. R. EVID. 407) precludes admission of
any evidence which shows that the defendant sought to correct a
situation which led to the accident at issue to prove the defendant's
negligence.131 As a California court put it: "the quality of in-hospi-
tal medical practice will be elevated by armoring staff inquires with
a measure of confidentiality." 132 The rule alone would not deny
admissibility to incident reports because the reports themselves are
not evidence of the subsequent remedial measures; they are used to
identify problem areas which need correction.133 This remedial,
quality improvement purpose is thwarted, however, when the re-
ports are admissible to demonstrate hospital negligence.
As the advisory committee note to Rule 407 suggests,
"ground[s] for exclusion restf- on a social policy of encouraging
people to take, or at least not discouraging them from taking, steps
in furtherance of added safety." '13 4 The public's interest in improv-
ing the quality and efficiency of health care is compelling and the
full disclosure of staff member's evaluations of the nature and cause
of "incidents" is critical to (1) assuring high quality health care
through safe and efficient practices and procedures, and (2) decreas-
ing risk to patients and losses to the hospital.135 Although a party's
admission is generally considered to be trustworthy,13 6 when courts
compel production of incident reports, their trustworthiness will in-
evitably diminish 1 3  because the health care provider preparing the
report may not fully disclose all the circumstances which might in-
131. See Werner v. Upjohn, 628 F.2d 848 (4th Cir. 1980) ("Rule 407 is designed to pro-
tect the important policy of encouraging defendants to repair and improve their products and
premises without the fear that such actions will be used later against them in a lawsuit").
132. Santa Rosa Memorial Hosp. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, 220 Cal. Rptr.
236, 242 (1985) (citing Matchett v. Superior Court, 40 Cal. App. 3d 623, 628-29 (1974)).
133. See Rees v. Doctor's Hosp., Slip. Op. Case No. CA-5226, (Ohio 1980) (holding that
the hospital's contention that incident reports should be privileged because of a public policy
to improve health care was not sufficient to afford them that privilege).
134. See supra note 55 for text of Rule 407.
135. See, eg., Bredice v. Doctors Hosp., Inc., 51 F.R.D. 187 (D.D.C. 1970) (holding that
the subject matter of hospital meetings are entitled to qualified privilege based on public
policy); Duran, supra note 22, at 61.
136. See, eg., Gaddy v. State Bd. of Registration for the Healing Arts, 397 S.W.2d 347,
354 (Mo. 1965) ("A party's admission against interest of a material fact relevant to an issue in
the case... is competent against him as substantive evidence of the fact admitted. And, for a
statement by a party to be competent as an admission against interest, it is not necessary that
it be a direct admission of the ultimate fact in issue, but it may be competent and of probative
value if it bears on the issue incidentally or circumstantially").
137. See Note, The Privilege of Self-Critical Analysis, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1083 (1983)
(noting that although the incident reports may continue to be factually accurate, less of the
incriminating evaluative information will be included in them for fear of liability).
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criminate him or his superiors. 13  For health care providers to keep
the public interest in improving health care foremost in their minds
when preparing incident reports, they must be able to rely on a con-
sistent privilege standard so that they can be certain that what they
report will not be used against them in court. They feel confident
that, just as conduct which creates a safer situation is not admissible
to prove negligence, neither should the tool used to point out the
unsafe situation, the incident report, be admissible for that pur-
pose. 139 Also, hospitals will be less likely to implement subsequent
remedial measures if incidents go unreported, and they have no
awareness of the problem until a lawsuit is brought against them.
An Ohio study demonstrates the problems created by reluctance
on the part of staff members to prepare incident reports.1" The
hospitals surveyed revealed that they had no prior notification of
approximately half of the incidents which resulted in legal claims
against the hospital, that there were no incident reports prepared
for thirty percent of those claims involving incidents in patient
rooms, and no incident reports filed for seventy percent of emer-
gency room incidents which resulted in suits against the hospital. 4 '
These hospitals' ability to limit risks to patients and themselves was
severely limited by staff fear that they would be indicted for negli-
gence by the use of incident reports.142 If consistent quality assur-
ance privilege attached to hospital incident reports, those problems
that resulted in suits against the hospital, as well as those that did
not but simply went unreported, could be called to the attention of
quality assurance managers and attorneys and corrected as quickly
as possible.
IV. MODEL RULE FOR HOSPITAL INCIDENT
REPORT PRIVILEGE:
Society's compelling policy reasons for excluding hospital inci-
dent reports from discovery 43 and the courts' division of opinion
138. See also Duran, supra note 22, at 60, and Allan & Barker, supra note 27, at 561.
Both articles note that fear of punitive actions discourages incident reporting.
139. See Marcia L. Finkelstein, Comity and Tragedy: The Case of Rule 407, 38 VAND. L.
REv. 585, 610 (1985) (discussing "the social policy of encouraging people to take safety
precautions").
140. See Duran, supra note 22, at 60.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. See Doe v. St. Joseph's Hospital of Ft. Wayne, 113 F.R.D. 677, 678 (N.D. Ind.
1987) (discussing the policy reasons for peer review committee privilege, which are also
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on the issue 44 together demand the establishment of a uniform rule
of exclusion for states to adopt as a complement to existing medical
peer review committee privilege statues. Courts have inconsistently
applied state statutes addressing the issue of privilege for hospital
incident reports because the laws have not delineated specific guide-
lines for discoverability and admissibility. 145 This model rule clari-
fies the existing ambiguous privilege standards as they apply to
hospital incident reports. The rule establishes clear standards for
incident report privilege to alleviate the uncertainty which discour-
ages full disclosure of information by health care workers as much
as the certainty of discoverability does. When health care workers
know with certainty that what they reveal in incident reports will be
used only to achieve two important objectives, to improve health
care and to assist the hospital attorney in preparing a defense, and
that it will not be revealed to plaintiffs' attorneys, they will more
readily offer helpful information and opinions. If only one privilege
is allowed, the hospital will certainly choose to protect itself from
liability through the attorney-client privilege so the quality im-
provement objective will be lost. Just as a criminal's communica-
tions to his psychiatrist, his attorney, and his wife are all privileged
because each communication carries a valid privilege in and of it-
self, so the hospital employee's communications to both the attor-
ney and the quality assurance committee should remain
confidential. Neither valid privilege should be defeated by the fact
that more than one exists. This model rule provides that certainty
for both the attorney-client privilege and the quality assurance priv-
ilege so that both the hospital's self-interest and the societal interest
in better health care are preserved.
analogous to those for incident report privilege, the court declared that "policing the quality
and professionalism of Health Care Providers is an extremely high priority").
144. See, eg., cases granting hospital incident report privilege: Enke v. Anderson, 733
S.W.2d 462 (Mo. 1987); Sierra Vista Hosp. v. Shaffer, 56 Cal. Rptr. 387 (1967); Bredice v.
Doctors Hosp., Inc., 51 F.R.D. 187 (D.D.C. 1970). Cases denying hospital incident report
privilege: Clark v. Norris, 734 P.2d 182 (Mont. 1987); State ex rel Children's Medical Center
v. Brown, 571 N.E.2d 724 (Ohio 1991); Bernardi v. Community Hosp. Ass'n., 443 P.2d 708
(Colo. 1968).
145. See State ex rel Children's Medical Ctr. v. Brown, 59 Ohio St. 3d 194 (1991) (inter-
preting OHlo Rv. CODE § 2305.251 (Banks Baldwin 1991), the statute granting medical
peer review privilege as inapplicable to hospital incident reports, though the lower court and
dissent reached the opposite report). See also supra note 128 for Illinois cases reaching differ-
ent results as to whether the peer review privilege statute applies to other types of hospital
review reports.
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MODEL RULE: HOSPITAL INCIDENT
REPORT PRIVILEGE
To qualify for privilege from pretrial discovery and admissibility
into evidence at trial the hospital incident report must:
(1) be prepared by witnesses within eight hours after the
incident;
(2) not contain factual information unavailable to opposing
counsel from alternate sources;
(3) be made by a hospital employee acting in good faith after an
unusual or untoward event which could result in a legal claim
against the hospital;
(4) be evaluative (critical) in nature, including, but not limited
to, the witness' opinions and impressions regarding causation of
the incident;
(5) provide recommendations for remedial measures;
(6) be delivered to the liability insurer, quality committee or in-
dividual, and risk management committee or individual within
seventy-two hours after the incident;
(7) be clearly designated as "CONFIDENTIAL INCIDENT
REPORT: FOR INTERNAL MANAGEMENT AND QUAL-
ITY ASSURANCE PURPOSES ONLY" (or an equivalent
designation);
(8) contain the responses, remedial and disciplinary recommen-
dations of the quality assurance or risk management personnel,
and a timetable for implementation within ninety days after the
incident.
The privilege may not be waived. Failure to adhere to any of the
aforementioned requirements may subject the hospital to loss of the
incident report privilege.
A. Preparation By Witnesses Within Eight Hours
After the Incident
The more timely the declarations of witnesses, the more likely
that their memories and perceptions will be accurate.146 The Mis-
souri courts recognized the importance of recording events in hospi-
tal incident reports while still "fresh in the mind of the person
[who] witnesses or discovers the incident," both to rectify problem
situations and to handle legitimate claims against the hospital
"fairly and expeditiously."1 4 7 Recommendations for QA and RM
146. See Lawrence M. Tribe, Triangulating Hearsay, 87 HARv. L. REv. 957, 958-59
(1974) (timely preparation would reduce the unreliability factor of "erroneous memory");
Jack B. Weinstein, et al, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EVIDENCE 247 (8th ed. 1988) (citing
Brown, LEGAL PSYCHOLOGY 88-89 (1926) "[a]s time passes, memory falls off, sharply at
first, then more slowly").
147. Enke v. Anderson, 733 S.W.2d 462, 464 (Mo. 1987).
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must be based on reliable data if it is to produce meaningful reme-
dial results. Plaintiffs must also have access to timely factual infor-
mation, and some courts have denied privilege to incident reports
because plaintiffs did not have access to the "timely declarations of
the witnesses" without the use of the incident report at issue. 148
Hospital policy should require that the medical record documenta-
tion be completed within eight hours as well.149 An Ohio court de-
nied privilege to a hospital incident report when a patient was found
"apparently dead" on the sidewalk outside the hospital. Plaintiffs,
the decedent's family, sought a directed verdict for negligence and
damages for the patient's pain and suffering prior to his death. Be-
cause the medical record was apparently an incomplete account of
the circumstances leading to the patient's death, the court assumed
without seeing it that the incident report prepared at the time of the
incident would provide more information. 1 0 The incident report
more likely would have been privileged if the medical record had
been prepared thoroughly and in an equally timely and complete
manner. 151
Hospitals should establish internal guidelines to assure compli-
ance with the eight hour requirement, such as noting the time and
date of the receipt of the reports by the quality committee. Enforce-
ment mechanisms and personnel are already present in most hospi-
tals since quality control programs are statutorily mandated in
many states 52 and are a prerequisite for national accreditation by
the JCAHCO. 15 3 QA and RM committees can monitor compliance
through random periodic chart audits and by comparing times,
dates, and facts in the medical record with the entries in the inci-
148. See Rees v. Doctors Hospital, No. CA-5226 (Ohio Ct. App. 1980); White v. New
York City Health & Hospitals Corp., No. 88 Civ 7536, 1990 LEXIS 3008.
149. See § B infra requiring that factual information be available to plaintiffs in the medi-
cal record.
150. Rees v. Doctors Hosp., No. CA-5226 (Ohio Ct. App. 1980). See also White v. New
York City Health & Hospitals Corp., 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3008 (S.D.N.Y. March 19,
1990) (plaintiffs successfully argued for discovery of a hospital incident report rather than
waiting to depose the witnesses because by the time of the deposition "memory has faded").
151. JCAHO and Medicare have established time limits for reporting to ensure accuracy
of records. Though timing of preparation does not impact directly on the admissibility of
hospital incident reports, the more accurate the reports are the more useful they will be for
their intended purpose: discovering and correcting inefficient or dangerous situations in the
hospital. See ROBERT D. MILLER, PROBLEMS IN HOSPITAL LAW 287-89 (5th ed. 1986).
152. See generally, Creech, supra note 105 for a discussion of state-mandated programs.
153. See Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals, The Performance Evaluation
Procedure (PEP) Primer and Other Materials (2d ed. 1975).
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dent reports. 154
B. Factual Information in Incident Reports Must Be Available
To Opposing Counsel From Alternate Sources
Requiring hospitals to provide all the factual information in the
medical record as well as in the incident report prevents the "veil of
secrecy" '55 from being lowered by hospital defendants and their at-
torneys. Plaintiff's burden of proof is often particularly difficult to
meet in the framework of a medical malpractice/hospital corporate
liability suit.156 Since hospital environments are foreign and highly
technical to most plaintiffs, the latter usually must rely on the ver-
sion of the facts provided by the hospital personnel who control
access to those facts. This is especially true when an injured plain-
tiff was sedated or anesthetized at the time of the injury. The ad-
vantage to the defendant who documents the facts completely and
accurately in both the medical record and in the incident reports is
that generally the work product doctrine protects the opinion por-
tion of the documents if the factual information they contain is ob-
tainable from independent sources.157
The ideal incident report contains more than just the factual
record of the incident. It contains the mental impressions of the
witnesses, their opinions regarding causation, and their recommen-
dations for corrective action. Defendant health care providers ar-
gue by analogy to the medical peer review privilege that to improve
the quality of health care, hospitals must foster uninhibited profes-
sional criticism via confidential incident reports. To justify the ar-
gument, reports must contain more than just the facts contained in
the medical record. 58 One case pointing out the importance of this
154. See GuiDo, supra note 16, and FisrA, supra note 15, at 202-03 for a discussion of
QA & RM auditing procedures.
155. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 506 (1947) (plaintiffs feared they would be disad-
vantaged by their lack of access to opposing counsel's investigative material).
156. See Clark v. Norris, 734 P.2d 182 (Mont. 1986) (denying ares ipsa loquitur instruc-
tion, the court nonetheless acknowledged plaintiff's difficulty in proving her allegation of
negligence during an operative procedure).
157. See Moldovan, supra note 50, at 824 (stating, "[a]s a general rule, discovery of work
product material will not be permitted if the information sought may be obtained by in-
dependent investigation such as interviewing or taking depositions of individuals from whom
information is sought").
158. See, eg., Porter v. Snyder, 115 F.R.D. 77, 78 (Kan. 1987) (holding that incident
reports are not privileged because they "are merely statements of fact"); John C. Lincoln
Hosp. and Health Ctr. v. Superior Court, 768 P.2d 188, 191 (Ariz. 1989) (holding that peer
review privilege did not protect incident reports from discovery because the incident report at
issue was merely a contemporaneous account of facts contained in the medical record).
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standard involved a hospital trauma committee which prepared an
incident report after a patient injured in an automobile accident was
brought to the hospital.15 9 After suffering a cardiac arrest, the pa-
tient was resuscitated but sustained permanent brain damage. 16°
Her family filed a subsequent negligence action against the hospi-
tal.161 Although defendants argued that the incident report pre-
pared by the trauma committee was protected by statutory peer
review privilege, the Arizona court could find no reason to deny
plaintiffs access to the report as it "constitute[d] only raw factual
information which may trigger... discussion, exchanges and opin-
ions" (the type of communications which would have been privi-
leged under the Arizona statute). 162
The rationale for hospital incident report privilege is not to deny
the facts to plaintiffs, but to shield potentially inculpatory informa-
tion which could prevent future incidents from occurring. Valid,
constructive criticism which analyzes in detail the negative impact
of a particular set of circumstances or actions by health care work-
ers which resulted in an incident may be useful in correcting the
problem. Such useful critique is discouraged if it may later be used
as ammunition by opposing counsel. 163 A plaintiff's attorney may
offer this self-critical analysis to exaggerate the fault contribution of
the particular health care personnel involved. The hospital and
health care workers may look worse in an incident report than in
actuality, because speculation as to causation does not necessarily
indicate actual causation, but may provide clues to ascertain the
truth about causation. 164 Using incident reports in an accusatory
fashion for either harsh internal disciplinary action1 61 or in a legal
159. John C. Lincoln Hosp. & Health Ctr. v. Superior Court, 768 P.2d 188, 189 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1989).
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. (referring to ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 36-445).
163. See Brendice v. Doctors Hospital, Inc., 50 F.R.D. 249, 250 (D.D.C. 1970), motion
reargued and denied, 51 F.R.D. 187 (D.D.C. 1970), aff'd mern. 479 F.2d 920 (D.C. Cir.
1973) (declaring that "[c]onstructive professional criticism cannot occur in an atmosphere of
apprehension that one doctor's suggestion will be used as a denunciation of a colleague's
conduct in a malpractice suit").
164. See Appendix A for sample incident report. The portions of the report calling for
speculation are clearly separate. A person trained to review the reports and evaluate the
information contained within could investigate the speculative information for accuracy.
Hostile plaintiffs' attorneys would use the information to inculpate the parties.
165. See Allan & Barker, supra note 27, at 561, and Duran, supra note 22, at 60 (discuss-
ing the deterrent effect of harsh internal on disclosure of information in incident reports).
Though not at issue in this note, these articles address constructive, non-threatening forms of
discipline and anonymous means of reporting incidents to encourage their remedial objective.
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action, diminishes their main objectives of quality enhancement and
loss prevention. 166
In addition to the hospital's internal enforcement mecha-
nisms 1 67 for comparing the factual account in the medical record
with that of the incident report, the plaintiff's attorney may request
that the judge perform an in camera inspection to compare the inci-
dent report and corresponding portions of the medical record dur-
ing the pretrial discovery period.1 68  Even in jurisdictions where
there is a statutory bar to discovery and admissibility of "[a]fl infor-
mation, interviews, reports, statements, memoranda or other data
.. used in the course of internal quality control.., or for improv-
ing patient care," courts have held that this language does not bar
in camera inspection. 169 Courts have interpreted such statutory
language in some instances to include a privilege for hospital inci-
dent reports, and, in other cases, to be limited to reports prepared
by committees whose purpose is quality assurance or risk manage-
ment in response to the incident reports."I The initial determina-
tion of whether the reports meet the standard for privilege should
therefore be left to the judge's discretion. 7 Hospital attorneys and
QA committees are less likely to manipulate the information in the
incident reports for self-interest if the in camera inspection motion
is available to the plaintiffs." 2 Because this model rule encourages
consistent preparation of incident reports, plaintiffs will not have to
166. But see B. Abbott Goldberg, supra note 51 (arguing idealistically that, to the con-
trary, health care workers are unaffected by the presence or absence of privilege; they are
always striving to provide better quality care).
167. Discussed supra in § A.
168. See generally, Porter v. Michigan Osteopathic Hosp. Ass'n, Inc., 428 N.W. 2d 719,
722 (Mich. App. 1988) (holding that in camera inspection is proper in determining whether
or not evidence claiming privilege in fact meet the privilege requirements).
169. See Marsh v. Lake Forest Hosp., 519 N.E. 2d 504, 507 (Ill. 1988); see also Santa
Rosa Memorial Hosp. v. Superior Court, 220 Cal Rptr. 236, 239 (1985) (holding court can
appropriately hold an in camera hearing to determine disclosure of records or reports of a
medical staff committee).
170. See Illinois cases interpreting the Illinois Medical Records Act, ILL. REV. STAT.
1985, ch. 110, par. 8, § 2101-2105, to mean that hospital incident reports are privileged.
Niven v. Siqueira, 487 N.E.2d 937 (Ill. 1985), and Sakosko v. Memorial Hosp., 522 N.E.2d
273 (II. App. 1988) (holding that hospital incident reports are privileged); Marsh v. Lake
Forest Hosp., 519 N.E.2d 504 (I1. 1988), and Richter v. Diamond, 483 N.E. 2d 1256 (Ill.
1985) (denying privilege under the statute).
171. See Villano v. State of New York, 534 N.Y.S. 2d 664 (1985) (holding that even
though the incident report was statutorily privileged, the judge could at his discretion after an
in camera inspection release parts of the report to plaintiff's because the factual information
contained within was not available to them from another source); see also Porter v. Michigan
Osteopathic Hosp. Ass'n., 428 N.W.2d 719 (Mich. 1988)).
172. See Waldman, supra note 58, at 493.
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guess whether or not the report exists; they can assume it does and
move early in trial preparation for the in camera inspection. If the
medical record appears to contain an incomplete account of factual
information, plaintiff's attorney can make specific requests to guide
the judge's examination of the report in the motion for inspection.
C. Hospital Employees Must Act In Good Faith In The
Preparations Of Incident Reports After An Incident
Which Could Result In A Legal Claim
Against The Hospital
The hospital incident report privilege must meet the general re-
quirements for a qualified privilege: "(1) communication made in
good faith; (2) the subject and scope of the communication is made
in good faith; (3) the communication is made to a person or persons
having a corresponding interest, right, or duty."17 Although made
in the course of business, the subject matter of the incident report
should not be considered "routine" business for the purposes of the
business records exception to the hearsay rule (FED. R. EVID.
803(6))1"4 because the report documents unusual events. 175 Because
the goal is loss prevention, the likelihood of a resulting legal claim
should be broadly interpreted to include even remote possibility of a
liability action, contrary to some recent court decisions constricting
the "prepared in anticipation of litigation" work product immunity
requirement.1 76 Hospitals would then be more likely to utilize inci-
dent reports to correct relatively minor problems, in addition to se-
173. Note, 61 N. C. L. REv. 1126, 1134 (1983) (citing Cameron v. New Hanover Memo-
rial Hosp., 293 S.E.2d 901, 915 (N.C. App. 1982)).
174. Id. at 1126; see also Sligar v. Tucker, 267 So. 2d 54, 55 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), cert
denied, 271 So. 2d 146 (1972) (finding hospital incident reports prepared for the hospital's
liability insurer were "not a part of the hospital business records").
175. At least one court has argued against considering hospital incident reports to be
business records because incident reports are prepared when the hospital fears a legal claim
may be brought, they lack reliability as business records when offered by the hospital. Picker
X-Ray Corp. v. Frerker, 405 F. 2d 916, 921 (8th Cir. 1969). The implication is that health
care workers may be motivated by self-interest in protecting their jobs and shielding them-
selves from personal liability and therefore may not be totally honest in documentation of
incidents. Id. at 921.
176. See Sims v. Knollwood Park Hosp., 511 So. 2d 157 (citing Diversified Indus. v.
Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 604 (8th Cir. 1977) ("[t]he work product rule does not come into
play merely because there is a remote prospect of future litigation"); Kay Lab. v. District
Court, 653 P.2d, 721, 722 (Colo. 1982) (citing Hawkins v. District Court, 638 P.2d 1372,
1379 (Colo. 1982) (holding that there must be a "'substantial probability of imminent litiga-
tion over the claim, or a lawsuit had already been filed.' Without such a showing, there is a
presumption that the documents were prepared in the ordinary course of... business").
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rious ones which may lead to death or disaster. 77
Courts which have applied a narrow proximity to litigation defi-
nition178 have done so to prevent parties from abusing attorney-cli-
ent or work product privilege. Such parties have made sweeping
declarations that records are privileged because they were for-
warded to the attorney and that, in "today's litigious society,"
whenever there is a negative outcome, the possibility of a law suit is
very real. 17 9 The incident report privilege, as established in this
model rule, remains a narrow privilege, applied to a specific docu-
ment, with a specific purpose: the information of health care (with a
derivative effect, loss prevention). Hospitals may not circumvent
the policy of open medical records8 by broadly claiming the privi-
lege for reports that do not meet the standards contained within this
rule." l The burden of proof will still be on the hospital to demon-
strate to the court that the incident report meets the privilege stan-
dard and that the medical record does not conceal any facts from
opposing counsel.
18 2
Courts hesitate to grant privilege to hospital incident reports be-
cause the concept of privilege runs counter to the underlying policy
of the discovery rules-to ensure that all parties have access to all
the relevant facts. 18 3 The federal discovery rules indicate a trend
177. See Creech, supra note 105, at 215 (discussing the purposes of incident reports).
178. See supra note 176 for the proximity test cited in Diversified Indus. v. Meredith.
179. Clark v. Norris, 734 P.2d at 187.
180. See generally GuIDO, supra note 16; FIESTA, supra note 15, at 173-93; COURNOYER,
supra note 17.
181. See John C. Lincoln Hosp. & Health Ctr. v. Superior Court, 768 P.2d at 191 ("the
mere fact that a committee has obtained evidence does not render that evidence privileged if
it was not previously privileged") (quoting Humana Hosp. v. Superior Court, 742 P.2d 1382,
1388-89 (Ariz. App. 1987). See also Ekstrom v. Temple, 553 N.E. 2d 424 (II1. App. Court
1990) (requiring that one who claims privilege in infection control records must show the
facts that give rise to it); Clark v. Norris, 734 P.2d 182, 187 (Mont. 1987) (denying work
product immunity to a hospital incident report the court declared "[a] privilege cannot be
created in a subject matter merely by transmitting it to an attorney... [but] [i]f the employer
directs the taking of a report for confidential transmittal to its attorney, the communication
may be privileged") (citing Sierra Vista Hosp. v. Superior Court, 56 Cal. Rptr. 387, 392
(1967)).
182. See Ekstrom v. Temple, 553 N.E.2d 424, 430 (11. App. Ct. 1990) (citing Cox v.
Yellow Cab Co., 337 N.E.2d 15, 17-18 (Ill. 1975), quoting Krupp v. Chicago Transit Author-
ity 132 N.E.2d 532, 536 (fll. 1956) "'[o]ne who claims to be exempt by reason of privilege
from the general rule which compels all persons to disclose the truth has the burden of show-
ing the facts which give rise to the privilege. 'His mere assertion that the matter is confiden-
tial and privileged will not suffice' "). The Ekstrom court recommends in camera inspection
as the means to determine that the privilege standard is met.
183. See, eg., Villano v. State of New York, 534 N.Y.S. 2d 664 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1985)
(refusing to grant privilege to psychiatric hospital incident report because of the patient's
need for the information); Bernardi v. Community Hosp. Ass'n., 443 P.2d 708 (Colo. 1968)
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toward a broad scope of discovery.184 To decide whether or not
privilege applies, courts must balance the self-incriminating value of
incident report evidence with the plaintiff's right to secure the
truth.18 If the hospital makes the factual information readily avail-
able (so that the "substantial need" and "undue hardship" require-
ments of rule 26(b)(3) 18 6 are met) to opposing counsel through the
medical record, it tips the scale in favor of privilege for hospital
incident reports.
The health care provider must have prepared the incident report
with candor and without self-interest or ill-will, however, in order
to secure the privilege. An objective good faith standard is neces-
sary to enforce this requirement of the model rule. The Uniform
Commercial Code contains one example of a statutory definition of
"good faith": "honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction con-
cerned."18 7 Black's Law Dictionary states that a good faith "encom-
passes, among other things, an honest belief, the absence of malice
and the absence of design to defraud or to seek an unconscionable
advantage." ' Determining whether the incident report maker ac-
ted in good faith is a question for the judge to determine at his or
her discretion based on the in camera inspection of the incident re-
port. If there are glaring discrepancies in the medical record, if wit-
nesses' accounts vary widely, if there are blanket accusations
without foundation, or the appearance of deception, the judge has
discretion to choose to deny privilege.1 8 9
(denying hospital incident report detailing the circumstances surrounding a surgical proce-
dure which resulted in further injuries, because of the patient's need for the information).
184. See FED. R. Civ. P., Discovery Rules and Advisory Notes.
185. See Williams, supra note 50, at 435 (noting the argument that privilege "violate[s]
the public's right to every man's evidence," quoting United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331
(1950)); Waldman, supra note 58, at 476 (analogizing attorney-client privilege with the privi-
lege against self-incrimination).
186. See supra note 48 for full text of FED. R. Civ. P. 26(bX3). The 1970 amendments to
the rules eliminated the lower standard for exceptions to privilege which required that the
party requesting production of a document only show "good cause" for the request, not sub-
stantial need nor an inability to obtain it without undue hardship from another source. See
FED. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee notes (1970).
187. U.C.C. § 1-201(19) (1977).
188. BLACK'S LAW DIcTIoNARY 693 (5th ed. 1990).
189. See supra notes 168, 169 and accompanying text for cases regarding judges' discre-
tion regarding admission of what would otherwise be privileged after in camera inspection
reveals a reason to deny privilege. However, again the problem reliability arises if the report
appears to contain dishonest information or malicious intent to implicate another as the cause
of the incident. See supra note 47; Picker X-Ray Corp. v. Frerker, 405 F.2d 916, 924 (8th
Cir. 1969) (incident reports designed to defend litigation contained statements by unnamed
persons, could not be substantiated).
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D. The Incident Report Must Be Evaluative (Critical) In
Nature, Including, But Not Limited To, The Witness's
Opinions And Impressions Regarding
Causation The Incident
Under an attorney-client privilege analysis, courts either have
applied a higher threshold of discoverability for or have disallowed
opinion evidence. 19° If the witnesses include mental impressions
about extenuating circumstances which may have contributed to
the incident, they create a more useful document for quality control
and risk management, but this self-critical analysis may also be self-
incriminating. 191 For example, if a confused patient fell and broke
her hip after climbing over the side rails of the bed, the medical
record would document the details of the fall, the patient's mental
status, any medications which the patient may have been taking
which would contribute to the confusion, x-rays that were taken
after the fall, and the radiologist's interpretation of the x-rays. The
incident report would include all of these details and also the fact
that two nurses called in sick for that shift so that it was impossible
to provide constant monitoring for the patient, that the design of
the bed was not adequate to restrain the patient because the side
rails were too easily disengaged, or, that the nurse had previously
reported to the patient's physician that medication X caused the
patient to become very disoriented and the physician refused to dis-
continue the medication.
In the hands of the hospital attorney and risk manager, the ad-
ditional information in the incident report would be used to develop
a contingency nursing staff which could be called upon when the
regular staff did not report to work. The attorney could advise the
risk manager about the potential for negligence action for failure to
provide adequate staffing, and the risk manager could work with
nursing administrators to determine how many additional staff
would be necessary to alleviate this problem. The incident report
would prompt the hospital to purchase special restraints or alter the
design of beds and side rails for confused patients. The hospital
would undertake an investigation of the physician's rationale for
continuing to prescribe medication X (perhaps the therapeutic ben-
efit to the patient outweighs the negative effect-the confusion) or
190. See, eg., Clermont, supra note 48, at 758 (noting the various privilege requirements);
Hyland & Forman, supra note 48, at 17 (discussing the different standards of admissibility for
opinion information).
191. See Waldman, supra note 58, at 479 (balancing the problem of self-incrimination
against the need for the incriminating information).
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monitor the physician's competence if this is not the first report of a
medication error by this particular doctor. Or, it could be used to
report to the pharmaceutical company that a particular drug pro-
duced an untoward effect, which could prompt further research as
to dosage, indications, and alternates for the drug.
In the hands of a plaintiff's attorney, the additional information
contained in the incident report could be used to demonstrate that
the nurses were negligent in their lack of vigilance to the patient and
that the hospital was negligent in its failure to provide adequate
staffing, appropriate equipment, or competent physicians.192 It
could be also used to prove willful negligence on the part of the
physician in continuing to prescribe a medication after notification
that it produced an untoward side effect.
To encourage health care workers to openly communicate more
than just raw factual information in incident reports, the reports
should include both open-ended questions and space for narrative
explanations and comments. 193 An environment of trust and en-
couragement of honest communication should be fostered by hospi-
tal administration, and staff should be rewarded rather than
punished for thorough documentation. 19
E. The Incident Report Must Provide Recommendations For
Remedial Measures
The ultimate goal of incident report privilege is to encourage
corrective action (the FED. R. EVID. 407 rationale). To achieve
this goal hospitals must create incentives for health care workers to
do more than document the facts and speculate as to causation; they
must require suggestions for change and improvement. 195 The em-
ployee who witnesses an accident, or is directly involved in causing
it, is often in the best position to correct the situation. In other
situations, an impartial expert, such as a risk manager, maintenance
engineer, infection control nurse, or medical director may be in a
better position to analyze the incident after it occurs and to propose
remedial measures.
192. The information might also be used to instigate a products liability action against
the pharmaceutical company and the bed manufacturer.
193. See Duran, supra note 22, at 60.
194. Id.
195. This model rule acknowledges that in some instances accidents are not preventable
and therefore no corrective action may be necessary. In those cases, the incident report
might contain a statement like "after careful analysis of the circumstances surrounding the
incident no remedial measures are recommended at this time."
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Cases which have granted privilege to hospital incident reports
or memoranda generated by individual health care providers or staff
committees by analogizing them to peer review committee privilege
have done so when the purpose of the report has clearly been to
improve the quality of hospital practices and procedures. 196 Hospi-
tals gain a lot of valuable information by evaluating the safety of
new brain surgery techniques, 197 the appropriateness of certain
types of patient restraints, 19 whether nursing rounds are being per-
formed frequently enough to monitor the patients sufficiently,1 99
causes of a patient's death,2° or the circumstances surrounding the
birth of an infant with cerebral palsy.201 If the particular problem is
addressed openly by the parties involved (the brain surgeon, the
nurses, or the obstetrician), then risk managers and quality assur-
ance personnel, as well as the hospital attorney and insurer can
make suggestions for correcting the problem.
Cases which have denied privilege to hospital incident reports
have disregarded their useful purpose in undertaking subsequent re-
pairs. Porter v. Snyder2"2 acknowledged the policy reason behind
the peer review committee privilege: "'to protect the public's gen-
eral health, safety, and welfare,' "203 but believe that this objective
was accomplished by the reports coming out of the review commit-
tee, rather than the reports going to the committee for evaluation. ° '
The Porter court, however, did reserve final judgement on the inci-
dent report until it had performed an in camera inspection to deter-
mine whether it might be helpful in formulating subsequent
remedial measures. 20 5 Dunkin v. Silver Cross Medical Center2' de-
nied privilege to incident reports of "slip-and-fall" accidents on the
hospital stairs, though the hospital CEO argued that the purpose of
the reports was to evaluate and correct problems "to improve the
196. See, eg., Niven v. Siqueira, 487 N.E.2d 937 (Ill. 1985); Laws v. Georgetown Univ.
Hosp., 656 F. Supp. 824 (D.D.C. 1987); Bredice v. Doctors Hosp., Inc., 51 F.R.D. 187
(D.D.C. 1970); Gallagher v. Detroit-Macomb Hosp. Ass'n., 431 N.W.2d 90 (Mich. Ct. App.
1988).
197. Niven, 487 N.E.2d at 939.
198. Gallagher, 431 N.W.2d at 92.
199. Id.
200. Bredice, 51 F.R.D. at 187.
201. Laws, 656 F. Supp. at 825.
202. 115 F.R.D. 77 (D. Kan. 1987).
203. Id. at 78 (quoting KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-4925(a) (Supp. 1986)).
204. Id
205. Id.
206. 573 N.E.2d 848 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991).
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quality of care and service.' '2 0 7 The Dunkin court decided that the
privilege only extended to reports relating to medical care of pa-
tients,2" 8 and Ms. Dunkin was a visitor at the hospital. The court
seemed to ignore the fact that patients and hospital staff members
also used the stairs, and that the reports would be useful for every-
one if the dangerous situation were corrected.
To enforce the policy of the subsequent remedial measures rule,
to be certain that hospital incident reports are used to improve the
quality, safety, and efficiency of hospital care, QA and RM person-
nel must periodically monitor the reports, assessing and implement-
ing any viable recommendations made in them for improving the
quality of hospital care, and adding any additional observations and
recommendations they have. In addition to the hospital's internal
monitoring of the reports, JCAHCO and liability insurers must pe-
riodically review incident reports and follow up to determine
whether or not measures are successful in reducing patient and hos-
pital losses.
F. Incident Reports Must Be Delivered Within Seventy-two
Hours After The Incident To The Liability Insurer,
Quality Assurance Committee Or Individual,
And Risk Management Committee
or Individual.
If hospitals wish to preserve the quality assurance privilege as
well as the attorney-client privilege, they must ensure that the per-
sons responsible for making health care improvement recommenda-
tions also receive the incident report. Unless the appropriate parties
receive the incident report soon after the incident occurs, its reme-
dial purpose cannot be achieved in a timely manner." 9 Under an
attorney-client privilege analysis only communications are protected
and information is not considered a communication until it is re-
ceived.210 Bernardi v. Community Hospital Association,2" denied
privilege to a hospital incident report prepared by a nurse after a
207. Id at 849.
208. Id.
209. See 18 HOSPLW 5 (Feb. 1985) (discussing St. Louis Little Rock Hosp. Inc. v.
Gaertner, 682 S.W.2d 146 (Mo. App. 1984).
210. Hyland & Forman, supra note 48 at 20-21 (discussing what constitutes confidential
"communication"): see also In re Death of Francis supra note 57 (stating "[t]here could be
no privileged communication without the receipt of the communication by the attorney"). In
a standard communication model there is a sender, a message, and a receiver. See DANIEL
K. STEWART, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF COMMUNICATION 24 (1968).
211. 443 P.2d 708 (Colo. 1968).
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seven year-old girl sustained permanent injuries from an antibiotic
injection because the report was prepared only at the hospital ad-
ministration's request and was not delivered to the hospital attor-
ney.212 The court did not recognize a separate quality assurance
privilege. The Bernardi court recognized that the report lacked use-
fulness in preparation for litigation (defendant hospital's argument),
just as it would lack usefulness in training the nurse in proper injec-
tion technique if it were not forwarded to RM or QA personnel.
Other cases have also denied privilege for hospital incident reports
under a work-product doctrine because the reports were not sent
directly to the hospital attorney.213 These decisions fail to recog-
nize that incident reports have another purpose besides alerting the
attorney to possible lawsuits-to improve the quality of health care
through the implementation of corrective action. If the incident re-
port in St. Louis Little Rock Hospital v. Gaertner,214 for example,
were sent to hospital QA and RM personnel, the attorney, and the
insurer with the certainty that its contents would remain confiden-
tial, future alcoholic patients might be prevented from drinking toi-
let bowl cleaner to commit suicide. This could occur because
housekeeping staff would feel free to discuss how the patient might
have had access to the dangerous substances without fear that such
information might be used to prove that the housekeeper was negli-
gent.21 5 If the appropriate personnel receive the incident report
within three days, correction of housekeeping procedures could oc-
cur, such as placing locks on janitor carts and closets, before other
patients injure themselves.
Incident reports are useful in the aggregate because they spot
unsafe trends in hospital care.216 Such unsafe trends could include
an inordinate amount of medication errors in a particular nursing
unit that could indicate an under staffing problem if medications are
consistently given late; a need for staff education as to methods of
212. Id. at 715.
213. See, e.g., St. Louis Little Rock Hosp. v. Gaertner, 682 S.W. 2d 146 (Mo. Ct. App.
1984) (holding that the client must communicate with the attorney in order for the incident
report to be privileged); In re Francis, supra note 57 ("how can there be communication to
counsel when the person who initiates the communication does not know it is going to
counsel?").
214. 682 S.W. 2d 146 (Mo. 1984).
215. Id Gaertner did, however, recognize the relationship of prompt reporting to privi-
lege when it denied privilege to reports which were collected and sent to the insurer on a
monthly basis. Id. at 150.
216. See Allan & Barker, supra note 27 (discussing the uses of pharmacy incident re-
ports); Duran, supra note 22, and Creech, supra note 105, at 215 (discussing general incident
report purposes).
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administration of drugs if, for instance, the nurses are crushing pills
for patients who cannot swallow, but the crushing decreases the ef-
fectiveness of the medication; a high rate of infection could indicate
the need for more isolation rooms and equipment such as masks,
gowns, and gloves. If incidents are reported in a timely manner
such trend information is more useful both to the hospital's internal
risk management and quality improvement programs, and to exter-
nal monitoring agencies which assess hospital outcomes for reim-
bursement and accrediting purpose.2 17
QA and RM personnel should distribute statistical reports
which track incident trends at least quarterly in order to implement
timely corrective measures. Timeliness monitoring, comparing the
time and date of incidents in the medical record to the time and
date of incident reports and their receipt by committees responsible
for developing and implementing remedial action plans, should be
conducted diligently by the QA and RM hospital personnel and pe-
riodically reviewed by JCAHO. JCAHO currently reports to hospi-
tals in their accreditation reviews whether or not each hospital is in
compliance with the risk management guidelines for incident re-
porting.218 Some hospital and physician malpractice insurance car-
riers also monitor the frequency of incident reporting. 219 These
practices should continue and include timeliness monitoring to pre-
serve the timely quality improvement goal of incident reports.
G. Incident Reports Must Be Clearly Designated As
"Confidential Incident Report: For Internal Risk Management
and Quality Assurance Purposes Only (Not a Part of Medical
Record)" Or An Equivalent Designation.
This provision addresses the dual arguments advanced by some
courts to deny hospital incident report privilege.220 Where incident
reports have been used both for internal quality assurance and to
alert the hospital attorney of a potential legal claim against the hos-
pital, some courts have held that the dual purpose disqualifies the
reports from privilege.221 This position ignores the fact that the
217. See sources cited supra note 216.
218. See JOINT COMMISSION ON HEALTHCARE ORGANIZATIONs, AMH ACCREDITA-
TION MANUAL (1992), supra note 180.
219. See, eg., St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance data, P.I.E. data.
220. See Bernardi v. Community Hosp., 443 P.2d 708 (Colo. 1968); Clark v. Norris, 734
P.2d 182 (Mont. 1986); State ex rel Children's Medical Ctr. v. Brown, 571 N.E.2d 724 (Ohio
1991).
221. State ex rel Children's Medical Ctr. v. Brown, 571 N.E.2d 724 (Ohio 1991) (holding
that a report prepared both to seek the attorney's advice and for quality assurance purposes
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dual purposes are at least equally compelling, and the interest in
subsequent improvement of hospital care may be even more com-
pelling to the public than the interest in assisting the attorney to
defend claims against the hospital. The Ohio appellate court judge
in State ex rel Children's Medical Center v. Brown222 recognized
this public policy when he determined that the incident report at
issue was "not part of the patient's medical record" and was "abso-
lutely privileged as an attorney-client communication and as a re-
port made available to a utilization committee," '223 because honesty
in the reports was essential to obtaining sound advice on the situa-
tion described in them.224  Sierra Vista Hospital v. Shaffer 225
granted privilege to an incident report sent to the insurer which
contained the heading "CONFIDENTIAL REPORT OF INCI-
DENT (NOT A PART OF MEDICAL RECORD)," 226declaring
that even though the report had more than one purpose, the domi-
nant purpose of preparation for litigation controlled.227 Sakosko v.
The Memorial Hospital22 granted a hospital incident report privi-
lege even though it was "shared" by a variety of committees be-
cause all were responsible "for internal quality control, medical
study and .. .improv[ing] patient care. 229 Enke v. Anderson230
granted privilege to an incident report which had the words 'Inci-
dent Report Form ... Not a part of medical records,' noting the
"[s]everal benefits.., derived from prompt reporting [of incidents]:
Corrective action can be taken. The facts of the occurrence are
fresh in the mind of the person who witnesses or discovers the inci-
dent. Many potential claims against the hospital can be eliminated
or, at least, controlled. '231 This court understood that loss preven-
tion and quality improvement were both important objectives of the
incident report.
was not privileged); Clark v. Norris, 734 P.2d 182 (Mont. 1986) (report prepared for both the
liability insurer and internal administrative purposes was not held to be privileged); Bernardi
v. Community Hosp. Ass'n, 443 P.2d 708, 715-16 (Colo. 1968) (denying privilege to incident
report the "primary purpose" of which could not be determined).
222. No. 11638, 1990 Ohio App. LEXIS 3008 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 12, 1990) (per
curiam), rev'd 571 N.E.2d 724 (Ohio 1991).
223. Id. at 3, 5.
224. See 24 HOSPLW 34 (Jan. 1991).
225. 56 Cal. Rptr. 387 (1967).
226. Id. at 392.
227. Id. at 392-93.
228. 522 N.E.2d 273 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988).
229. Id. at 274.
230. 733 S.W.2d 462 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
231. Id. at 464-65.
[Vol. 3:259
PROMOTING BETTER HEALTH CARE
Quality assurance and risk management (liability loss preven-
tion) activities are inexorably linked.2 3 2 Although courts are pres-
ently split on the issue of privilege for dual purpose hospital
incident reports, applying a special designation to the forms to indi-
cate that they are not a part of the medical record alerts the health
care providers who prepare them, the parties who later evaluate
them for RM and QA purposes, and the judges who examine them
in camera that they are "restricted" documents to be used to de-
velop higher standards of care.2 3 3 Preprinted forms, designed by
the hospital attorney and/or the QA and RM committees,2 34 with
both narrative portions and blanks for responses to specific ques-
tions from the attorney, insurer and QA director, should be submit-
ted to JCAHO for approval under the quality assurance
guidelines.235
H. Incident Reports Must Contain The Responses, Remedial
And Disciplinary Recommendations Of Risk Management or
Quality Assurance Personnel, And A Timetable For
Implementation, Of All Recipients Within Ninety Days After the
Incident
The persons responsible for monitoring and recommending
health care improvement measures must take action in a timely
manner to correct problems in health care delivery-to achieve the
very purpose of the incident report. These persons need not have
the specific title of "Quality Assurance Director" or Risk Manager.
They may include the hospital attorney, the liability insurer, a peer
review committee, a quality assurance director or committee, a risk
manager or risk management committee, a nursing administrator,
or a maintenance and engineering director. Measures undertaken
within a relatively short period of time will prevent further injuries
or problems resulting from the same set of circumstances. Ninety
days allows sufficient time for thoughtful examination of the prob-
lem and potential solutions by all parties involved.
Courts granted the privilege of self-evaluation to hospital inci-
232. See Puetz, supra note 27, at 247 (discussing quality assurance and risk management
activities); JoiNr COMMISSION ON ACCREDITATION OF HEALTHCARE ORGANIZATIONS,
AMH ACCREDITATION MANUAL (1992) (guidelines for quality assurance and risk manage-
ment activities); Monagle, supra note 22, at 28-29 (discussing risk management activities
which improve quality of health care).
233. See Hyland & Forman, supra note 48, at 20-21 (discussing "[h]ow to keep communi-
cations privileged").
234. See Appendix A for sample incident report form.
235. JCAHO ACCREDITATION MANUAL FOR HOSPITALS (1992), supra note 180.
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dent reports in Bredice236 and Laws 237 to promote the kind of ex-
change of information which could lead to the improvement of
hospital care. This goal was reaffirmed in Penland v. Georgetown
University Hospital238 when the court noted the "significant public
interest served by promoting frank internal evaluation of hospital
procedures and practices, hopefully resulting in enhanced patient
care.'1 239 A nurse had filled out an incident report and sent it to a
director of nursing at the hospital after a patient suffered pain and
scarring from an intravenous line.2 ° The report was intended to
elicit the director's responses and recommendations regarding ame-
lioration of the incident.241 Statutes establishing peer review privi-
lege also acknowledges this evaluative purpose.242
Just as timely reporting of incidents is essential to taking effec-
tive corrective action, so is a timely response to the reports.
243 If
recommendations for and implementation of subsequent remedial
measures occur well after the prompting incident, the risk of addi-
tional incidents and claims increases. Circumstances may have
changed which compound an existing problem as well. This is espe-
cially true if there is a maintenance problem that the staff fails to
report such as a leaking roof which results in a slip and fall the first
time and later a serious head injury when a huge chunk of soggy
ceiling tile comes loose, knocking a patient or visitor unconscious;
or a short in an electrical system which results in minor shocks at
first and later electrocutes a patient. Hospitals should establish in-
ternal monitoring mechanisms through existing RM and QA per-
sonnel to ensure that recommendations and follow-up corrective
actions based on incident reports are timely as the reports
themselves.
I. Waiver
The privilege may not be waived by the hospital or any other
party to the incident report. Generally, hospital employees operate
236. 50 F.R.D. 249 (D.D.C. 1970), aff'd, 479 F.2d 920 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
237. 656 F. Supp. 824 (D.D.C. 1987).
238. No. CIV.A.87-1247, 1987 WL 25668 (D.D.C. Nov. 12, 1987).
239. Id. at 1.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-4915(3) (Supp. 1991); ILL. REV. STAT. cl. 110, para. 8-
2101 (1990); MAss. GEN. LAws, ch. 112 § 5 (1986); N.Y. CIv. PRAC. L. & R. § 3101 (Con-
sol. 1991).
243. See CARROLL, supra note 30, at 91 (discussing "[c]orrective action" and "follow-up"
quality assurance measures).
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as agents of their employer hospital for liability purposes.2" In
some instances, however, plaintiffs have filed separate suits against
nurses and other health care workers as well as the hospital and
doctors. If any of the parties to the report, either the preparer, the
parties named in the report as wrongdoers, or the hospital were al-
lowed to waive the privilege in order to avoid personal liability,
their defensive use of the report would defeat the policies of both
the attorney-client and the quality assurance privileges. Parties
who prepare and sign the incident report should take personal re-
sponsibility for the contents of the reports so that they can feel cer-
tain that their opinions and impressions will be kept out of court
because failure to adhere to any of the model rule requirements may
subject the hospital to loss of the incident report privilege. If the
hospital employer is allowed to waive the privilege without the
preparer's permission, the preparer's reliance on the confidentiality
of the report will be shaken. 45 Health care workers will be more
thorough and careful to comply with the model rule requirements if
noncompliance results in forfeiture of the privilege and their confi-
dential communications will be divulged. Although the hospital is
the client, and under a corporate attorney-client privilege model
would normally be the party entitled to waive the privilege of its
employees' communications, in this case the employees must be cer-
tain that the hospital may not waive in order to encourage the com-
munications in the first place. This non-waiver policy protects the
policies of both the attorney-client privilege and the quality assur-
ance privilege the confidential reports promote.
V. CONCLUSION
Safer, more efficient, consistent, and economical medical care is
compelling societal interest, as is abating unnecessary expense of the
malpractice crisis.2' Quality assurance and risk management pro-
grams already required by national hospital accreditation boards
244. See HEALTH CARE REGULATION CASEBOOK (1990) (discussing corporate and vica-
rious liability for hospitals).
245. See Marcus, supra note 64, at 1615 (noting that "[t]he erosion [of confidence] that
results from waiver must sometimes make that assurance [of confidentiality] seem hollow").
246. The American Bar Association's (ABA) recommendations regarding medical pro-
fessional liability evidence the fact that it is not only health care workers who are negatively
impacted by the proliferation of medical malpractice suits. The ABA suggests more licensing
and disciplinary boards and risk management programs which will improve the quality of
care delivered to patients as well as lowering hospital exposure to liability. A.B.A. Special
Committee on Medical Professional Liability Report to the House of Delegates. (undated,
unnumbered).
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and some state statutes are facilitating improvements in health care.
Quality assurance committees, risk managers, liability insurers and
hospital attorneys can only make effective recommendations for im-
provement and discipline if the participants and witnesses of unto-
ward events in the hospital will give complete, accurate and timely
reports of these incidents and the circumstances surrounding them.
Health care workers have a significant disincentive to reveal details
about causation and fault and to suggest corrective action when
such information could be used to prove their personal negligence
in a liability claim against the hospital.
The protection of a definitive privilege standard is necessary to
encourage the flow of information between health care workers and
those in a position to change procedures and policies for the better.
Existing privileges limit the scope of discovery and admissibility of
certain evidence in general, but uncertainty as to whether privilege
may or may not be granted by a court because standards remain
unclear has the same chilling effect on disclosure of information as
if no privilege existed. A privilege standard which ensures plaintiffs
full access to the factual account of the incident, while at the same
time protecting the confidential communications of health care
workers who act in good faith to inform attorneys, insurers, QA
committees and risk managers about dangerous situations and em-
ployees, will promote the flow of information and thereby raise the
quality of health care.
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REPORT TO QUALITY RESOURCE MANAGEMENT OFFICE
G. MEDICATIONS
01. _ Missing
02. __ Drug/dose
03. _ Dose
04. __Route
05. _ Frequency
06. - Time 13. _ Technique
07. _ Dosage form 14. _ Labeling
08. _ Preparation 15. - Dispensing
09. _ Infiltration 99. __ Other
10. _ Fluid rate
Ordered: Given: For IV Meds Indicate
Drug & Dose: Drug & Dose: -IV Piggyback
Rte: 01. Topical Rte: 01. Topical IV Push
02. _ Oral 02. _ Oral __Continuous
03. _ IM/SQ 03. __ IMISQ
04. _ Peripheral IV 04. __ Peripheral IV Given VIA
05. _ Central Une 05. _ Central Une __ Infusion Pump
06. Hickman/Brovlac 06. __ Hickman/Broviac - PCA/Epldural
07. _ Multi-lumen 07. _ Multi-lumen Pump
08. _ Feeding Tube 08. _ Feeding Tube __Enteral Feeding
99. _ Other 99. __ Other Pump
Procedure/Pollcy/Practlce
01. - Patient Identification 04. - Documentation 07. _ Allergy Identification
02. _ Use of Equipment 05. _Technique 08. _ Equipment functioning
03. _ Transcription 06. _ Knowledge 99. - Other
H. SKIN INTEGRITY Stage: I. OTHER TYPE OF OCCURRENCE
Location: Size: 01. _ Signed out AMA 07. _ Use of equip.
01. _ Sacrum Hospital Acquired? 02. -AWOL 08. - Fire
02. -Buttocks -Yes 03. - Self-inflicted 09. _Theft
03. _ Heel No 04. - Struck by tool/ 10. -Response
04. _ Elbow Etiology: equipment Time
05. - Shoulder 05. _ Patient's property 11. _ Pt. preparation
99. - Other 06. Equipment 12. _Technique
functioning 99. - Other
J. ANESTHESIOLOGY K. RADIOLOGY L LABORATORY
01. _ Respiratory Contrast Reaction 01. - Collection Technique
02. _ Neurological 01. _ Mild 02. __Turnaround Time
03. Spinal HA 02. _Moderate 03. - Results Reporting
04. _ Acute MI 03. _ Severe 04. _ Patient Satisfaction
05. _ Cardiac arrest 04. _Turnaround time 99. _ Other
06. __ Dental, injury 99. - Other
07. _ Ocular Injury
99. ___Other Assession #
M. SURGICAL PROCEDURE
01. _Sharp count 06. _ Equipment functioning 09. Specimen
02. _ Sponge count 07. __ Use of equipment 10. __ Delay
03. _ Equipment count 08. -Trauma __ limb 99. - Other
04. - Sterile Field - organ
05. _ Technique _ skin
DESCRIPTION
Deacrlptlve/narratlve about the reason for the occurrence of the event:
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Review of circumstances surrounding conditions of the area at time of event:
N. EFFECT
00. _ No apparent injury 07. _ Dislocation 14. __Skin reaction
01. __ Adverse reaction 08. __ Perforation 99. __ Other
02. _ Burn 09. _ Sprain or strain
03. Concussion 10. Agitation or confusion Physician notified:
04. __ Contusion or laceration 11. __ Therapeutic delay
05. _ Retained foreign object 12. - Break in skin integrity
06. __ Fracture 13. Corneal abrasion Time:
O. TREATMENT
00. _ None 07. __ Skin barrier Physician's signature
01. __ X-Ray 08. _ Therapeutic bed
02. _ Chemical intervention 09. __ Consult
03. __ Sutures 10. _ Lab Work Did event result in prolonged
04. _ Surgery 11. _ Compress stay?
05. _ Monitoring/observation 12. __ Dressing 
- Yes __ No
06. __ Restraints 99. _ Other
FOLLOW UP
Recommendations:
Actions:
Signature of Unit/Department Manager:
Witnesses:
Staffing: Census-
FOR RNs Acuity
OFFICE LPNs Workload
USE NUAs AHPWI
ONLY AHPPD
RQMO#
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